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ABSTRACT
Detroit has failed and its infrastructure is crumbling. But Detroit is not an
isolated case. It is a paradigmatic example of increasing urban decay across
the United States. While commentators have warned that the declining state of
the country’s infrastructure threatens U.S. prosperity, there is a bigger issue at
stake. Decaying urban environments jeopardize the rule of law, undermining
the very foundation of the social contract.
This Article shows that the strength of the rule of law in a given country
can be predicted by that government’s ability (or inability) to provide public
services—particularly, a livable urban environment. When urban decay sets
in, individuals are led to believe that the government and thus citizens as a
collective have abandoned their commitments to following the basic rules
governing the social contract. This, in turn, reduces incentives of individuals to
engage in lawful behavior. As a result, the rule of law is, like the city itself, left
in shambles. In support of this theoretical account, we provide empirical
evidence that urban decay weakens the rule of law.
As a normative matter, we claim that U.S. austerity policies aimed at
incentivizing municipal fiscal accountability have produced the government’s
failure to provide adequate urban infrastructure. We argue that selective
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centralized support of local goods and services can better balance the dual
goal of preserving the rule of law and encouraging municipal fiscal
accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
The bankruptcy of Detroit1 has brought renewed attention to the city’s
crumbling infrastructure and urban blight.2 As ubiquitous images of Detroit
attest,3 abandoned and decaying buildings dominate the cityscape, trash
accumulates in empty lots, broken sidewalks run along pothole-riddled streets,
decrepit bridges threaten collapse, shattered streetlights darken unsafe streets,
and once grand public libraries, theaters, and train stations stand shuttered and
defaced, symbols of a city in ruins.
This state of decline has earned Detroit the infamous designation of “most
miserable city” in America.4 But the Motor City is not alone in its crumbling
urban infrastructure. Detroit is a paradigm of declining cities across the United
States—from Baltimore, Maryland5 to Gary, Indiana6 to San Bernardino,
1 Detroit filed for bankruptcy on July 18, 2013, qualifying as both the largest American city to ever file
for bankruptcy and the largest municipal bankruptcy ever in terms of debt, with about $18 billion in
outstanding liabilities at the time of the filing. See Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt,
Detroit Tumbles Into Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroitfiles-for-bankruptcy.html; see also Detroit Bankruptcy is the Nation’s Largest, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/07/18/us/detroit-bankruptcy-is-the-largest-in-nation.html (providing
data on the five largest U.S. municipalities filing for bankruptcy in the past 60 years).
2 See, e.g., Mark Binelli, How Detroit Became the World Capital of Staring at Abandoned Old
Buildings, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/magazine/how-detroitbecame-the-world-capital-of-staring-at-abandoned-old-buildings.html; Peter Hitchens, From Motown to Ghost
Town: How the Once Mighty Detroit Is Heading Down a Long, Slow Road to Ruin, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (July
9, 2011, 16:01 EST), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2012971/From-Motown-Ghost-town-Howmighty-Detroit-heading-long-slow-road-ruin.html; Steven Rattner, We Have to Step In and Save Detroit, N.Y.
TIMES OPINIONATOR, (July 19, 2013, 10:03 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/we-haveto-step-in-and-save-detroit/ (calling for billions in reinvestment spending to save Detroit).
3 See, e.g., YVES MARCHAND & ROMAIN MEFFRE, THE RUINS OF DETROIT (2011) (photographic project
capturing Detroit’s urban decay).
4 Kurt Badenhausen, Detroit Tops 2013 List of America’s Most Miserable Cities, FORBES (Feb. 21,
2013, 2:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2013/02/21/detroit-tops-2013-list-of-americasmost-miserable-cities/.
5 Baltimore’s decline was poignantly portrayed in hit television series The Wire (HBO television
broadcast 2002–2008), which was filmed in Baltimore, with each series exploring a different facet of the
relationship between the city’s physical and moral decay. See THE WIRE: URBAN DECAY AND AMERICAN
TELEVISION 23–91 (Tiffany Potter & C.W. Marshall eds. 2009) (collection of essays assessing the relationship
between the show and city). Notwithstanding the success of The Wire, Baltimore has not transitioned to a more
livable urban environment. See, e.g., Kathie Davies, Five Years After The Wire Left Screens, the TV Set
Remains . . . How the Real Baltimore Is Still Poverty-Plagued City of Series, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Apr. 11,
2013, 09:04 EST), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2307221/Baltimore-poverty-plagued-city-5-yearsTV-The-Wire-left-screens.html.
6 See, e.g., Alicia Munnell et al., Are Cities Fiscal Woes Widespread? Are Pensions the Cause?, STATE
AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston Coll., Boston, Mass.), Dec. 2013, at 4, available
at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/slp_36_508rev.pdf (“Thousands of abandoned buildings
downtown and throughout the neighborhoods have for years attracted criminal activity and Gary was known
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California7—where urban infrastructure is crumbling and distressed municipal
governments struggle to provide basic public services.8 To paint a national
picture: Almost one-third of the major roads in the United States are in “poor
or mediocre condition;”9 nearly a quarter of all bridges are “structurally
deficient” or “functionally obsolete;”10 about half of U.S. households lack
access to public transit;11 and the electrical grid is strained and outdated,
costing the economy as much as $180 billion annually in power outages and
disturbance.12 Years of inadequate investment are starting to show.
The impact of this collapsing urban infrastructure on the global
competitiveness of the United States has been widely discussed.13 But the
for years as the ‘murder capital.’”); James Nye, City of the Century that Became a Ghost Town: Tragic
Portraits from the Decaying World of America’s Industrial Heartlands, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (July 14, 2012,
08:50 EST), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2173761/Tragic-portrait-city-decline-The-desolate-ruinsGary-Indiana-reveal-decaying-heart-Americas-proud-industrial-centre.html (providing a vivid portrait of
Gary’s pervasive urban decay).
7 Since declaring bankruptcy in 2012, the city of San Bernardino has cut municipal services to near
“nonexistence.” See Ian Lovett, A Poorer San Bernardino, and a More Dangerous One, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2013, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/15/us/crime-rises-in-san-bernardino-afterbankruptcy.html. The parks department has been “shredded” with park maintenance left to volunteers, the
police force has been drastically cut, leaving neighborhood watch groups to try to maintain order, and
discarded bulk items are left to pile on the sidewalks. Id. The mayor’s office is down to one paid employee, the
mayor himself, and one volunteer chief of staff, who is the mayor’s own son. Id.
8 Since 2010, in addition to Detroit, at least thirty-seven other cities and towns have declared bankruptcy
and others teeter on the edge of financial collapse. See Bankrupt Cities, Municipalities List and Map,
GOVERNING,
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-and-defaults.html
(last updated Dec. 3, 2013) (providing an interactive map of all municipalities filing for bankruptcy since
2010). Michelle Anderson provides additional examples of the cuts in public services that have occurred in
many of these cities. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1157–73
(2014).
9 AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2013 REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE 48 (2013),
available at http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org [hereinafter 2013 REPORT CARD].
10 Id. at 36.
11 See id. at 7.
12 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, “GRID 2030”—A NATIONAL VISION FOR ELECTRICITY’S SECOND 100
YEARS 5 (2003), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/Electric_Vision_
Document.pdf.
13 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, A NEW ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT 30 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economicpolicy/Documents/20120323InfrastructureReport.pdf [hereinafter 2012 TREASURY REPORT] (“[T]he United
States is investing less in infrastructure than other nations. . . . [I]t is clear that persistent neglect of our
infrastructure will impact America’s competitive position vis-à-vis the rest of the world.”); U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, THE COMPETITIVENESS AND INNOVATIVE CAPACITY OF THE UNITED STATES 5-2 (2012), available
at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2012/january/competes_010511_0.pdf (stressing
that both improving traditional infrastructure such as the U.S. highway system, and developing modern
infrastructure like widely accessible broadband internet, is important); see also Bruce Katz et al., America’s
Infrastructure: Ramping Up or Crashing Down, BROOKINGS INST., 1 (Jan. 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/~/
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failure to invest adequately in a livable urban environment has potentially more
troubling, and overlooked, consequences. As this Article describes, this failure
jeopardizes the shared commitment of citizens and public officials to the rule
of law14—spurring a downward spiral of widespread rule defection and
increased coercive enforcement at significant social costs.
In this account, the rule of law stands at the heart of the social contract,15
whereby individuals voluntarily unite into civil society and agree to be subject
to that society’s laws in exchange for social order. Within this framework,
individuals give a centralized authority—or government—a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force in order to enforce legal rules. In addition, the
government is tasked with coordinating the production of certain essential
goods and services, such as urban infrastructure. Just as self-interested
individuals cannot be expected to spontaneously abide by laws, even where
they have implicitly contracted to do so,16 neither can they be expected to
spontaneously invest (or invest optimally) in “public goods,”17 as they cannot
enjoy these goods exclusively.18

media/research/files/papers/2008/1/infrastructure%20katz%20puentes/01_infrastructure_katz_puentes.pdf
(“Infrastructure has a dramatic effect on the economic competitiveness of our nation, the health of our
environment and our quality of life.”). The popular press has also largely emphasized the link between
mounting urban decay and decreasing global competitiveness of the United States. See, e.g., Michael Porter &
Jan Rivkin, What Washington Must Do Now, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 2012, http://www.economist.com/news/
21566902-eight-point-plan-restore-american-competitiveness-what-washington-must-do-now;
Harold
L.
Sirkin, Improving America’s Competitiveness, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 25, 2012), http://www.
businessweek.com/articles/2012-06-25/improving-america-s-competitiveness.
14 See infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (describing the debate around the meaning of the term
“rule of law”).
15 The notion of social contract was originally developed in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes
and later differently elaborated by John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. The common idea
underpinning these philosophers’ treatments of the social contract was that individuals voluntarily agree to
collectively binding social arrangements, which, given individual consent, create normatively desirable
outcomes. For a discussion of the similarities and the differences in the elaboration of the social contract by
these philosophers, see Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract Law
and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 847–80 (1985). In the twentieth century, John Rawls
resurrected the idea of the social contract, arguing that social arrangements are only legitimate if they would be
freely and rationally chosen by all individuals in a hypothetical “original position,” in which each individual’s
preferences and capacities are set aside under a “veil of ignorance.” See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
136–42 (1971).
16 When individuals are self-interested, there will always be circumstances in which it is individually
profitable to break agreed-upon rules. See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
17 In addition to urban infrastructures, typical examples of public goods include internal and external
security, health, and education. It is worth observing that broad definitions of urban infrastructure also tend to
include education and health infrastructure. See, e.g., 2012 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 13, at 2, 15, 16
(including hospitals and schools as part of urban infrastructure as well). For empirical convenience, however,
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The government’s dual role provides different information to individuals.
When the government intervenes to prevent law breaking, observers obtain
information about that discrete rule infraction. This information, however, is
insufficient for individuals to form a belief as to whether most others are
abiding by, or deviating from, the rule of law.19 In contrast, exchanges between
citizens and government as provider of public goods are typically highly
interactive and long term—as the nature of such goods make them crucial to
the daily well-being of all citizens.20 Accordingly, what the government does,
as the provider of public goods, gives individuals a much better sense of what
other individuals are doing. Indeed, the long-term production of public goods
is premised on the government’s ability to coordinate citizen contributions to
such goods (typically through taxation)21 and the maintenance of these public
goods sends signals that are consistent with rule abidance by others.22 Hence,
access to adequate and well-maintained public goods induces citizens to infer
that legal rules and institutions are meaningful and that most individuals adhere
to the social contract.
Given the primacy of one’s urban environment, we argue that the
government’s provision of adequate urban infrastructure plays an especially
salient role in signaling to individuals that most others conform their behavior
to legal rules. This, in turn, fosters an individual’s sense that following the
in this Article urban infrastructure only refers to “basic infrastructure,” such as road, bridges, electric grids,
water systems, and the like. See infra notes 166–67 and accompanying text.
18 Given the nonexclusive character of public goods, once they are produced, everyone can free ride on
their existence, which frustrates incentives for their production. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL.,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 350, 362 (1995). Paul Samuelson is largely credited as having introduced the theory
of public goods in his classic 1954 article The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. See Paul A. Samuelson, The
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 388–89 (1954).
19 While repeated enforcement intervention may lead people to believe that lawlessness is on the rise, it
does not necessarily reflect a society-wide abandonment of the rule of law. Rather, the government may
simply be pursuing its function in preventing rule infractions effectively. Similarly, scarce enforcement
intervention may either indicate that most people abide by law or that the government is inadequately fulfilling
its role as public enforcer. In both cases, the information observers obtain is not conclusive as to whether most
individuals are abiding to, or deviating from, the basic rules governing the social contract.
20 This is especially so in the case of urban infrastructure, which directly and inescapably affects the
daily lived experience of all citizens. See infra notes 67–73 and accompanying text.
21 The government’s role as enforcer also embodies society as a whole, as that role is likewise premised
on the coordination of citizen contributions through taxation. See infra note 52 (explaining that rule
enforcement can itself be regarded as a public good). However, the discrete nature of the government’s actions
as public enforcer makes those actions less informative about the degree of individual adhesion to the social
contract. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
22
Well-maintained urban infrastructure prompts a heuristic about the level of individual adhesion to the rules
of the social contract, as such infrastructure would not be there (or would be deteriorated) without most people
abiding to such rules.
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rules is valuable. As a result, “social cooperation” (rule abidance) and “social
advocacy” (taking actions to hold both fellow citizens and public officials
accountable to the law) emerge as an equilibrium in such an environment.23
Under this social equilibrium, the rule of law is strengthened, and coercive
government enforcement becomes less necessary, creating net gains for
society.
Urban decay,24 in contrast, leads individuals to believe that the government
and thus citizens as a collective have abandoned their commitment to follow
the rules. This, in turn, causes individuals to respond rationally by placing less
value on their own law abidance. Social cooperation and social advocacy are
undermined. Without support from the bottom, the rule of law begins to
crumble—setting in motion a vicious cycle potentially leading to a break down
in the rule of law entirely. Once this vicious cycle is set in motion, increased
coercive enforcement—such as “zero tolerance” policing strategies—cannot
salvage the rule of law. Rather, such enforcement increases the risk of
governmental abuse of power—abuse which is characteristic of a polity
lacking a strong rule of law.25 Moreover, stricter coercive enforcement can
only compensate for the loss of social cooperation and social advocacy to a
limited extent, and at significant costs.26
23 See Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Microfoundations of the Rule of Law, 17 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. 21, 23 (2014) (“Our approach emphasizes that the concept of the rule of law is part of an
equilibrium. The rule of law does not reside in particular institutions, beliefs, or behaviors. It is a description of
the nature of an equilibrium arising from the interaction of institutions, beliefs, and behaviors.”). Like Hadfield
and Weingast, we also attempt to provide a microfoundation of the rule of law—in the sense that we focus on
how individual behavior and beliefs produce aggregate outcomes. However, we consider a more complex
transactional environment, where the role of the government is not just providing coercive enforcement, but
also supplying public goods.
24 The term “urban decay” in this Article also refers to the decay of “suburban” areas, rather than just city
centers. Indeed, it is worth observing that while 82.4% of the U.S. population lives in metropolitan areas, the
largest percentage of that population lives in suburban areas. See The World Fact Book: Urbanization, CIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2212.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2014).
25 See infra notes 45–47, 113–19 and accompanying text.
26 See Hadfield & Weingast, supra note 23, at 38 (“[W]e believe that a legal order cannot be stabilized by
centralized government coercion alone; robust legal orders depend on widespread support in the form of social
sanctions and routine voluntary compliance.”). This account of the consequences of urban decay casts a doubt
on the popular “broken windows theory” (BWT) of deterrence. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling,
Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29. Conflating minor physical disorder (e.g., littering
and graffiti) and minor social disorder (e.g., drug dealing and public drinking) as concurrent sources of urban
decay, the BWT suggests that urban decay, if left unattended, may cause serious, and even violent, crime. See
id. at 31–32. “[T]he potential criminals do not know the probability of being detected in a neighborhood, but
the lack of enforcement of minor crime and disorder fills this void and signals low enforcement,” incentivizing
criminal activity. See Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York
City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 281 (2006). On these assumptions, the BWT
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Assuming that welfare maximization is a normative goal of public policy,
why do governments fail to provide and maintain quality urban infrastructure?
This Article argues that such a failure is an unintended consequence of
long-standing austerity policies at both the national and subnational levels
vis-à-vis local municipalities. Austerity, operationalized at the state level
through the “fiscal constitution,”27 is commonly justified by the argument that
avoiding subsidies to local communities is instrumental in forcing communities
to maintain fiscal discipline.28 This argument, however, ignores the trade-off
between the ex ante gains from austerity and its ex post social costs such as a
weaker, or even broken, rule of law. While a detailed blueprint for optimally
solving this trade-off is beyond the scope of this Article, we suggest that
selective centralized support of local services, including local infrastructure,
might better balance the dual goal of preserving the rule of law and
encouraging financial accountability at the local level.
The Article proceeds as follows. We lay out our basic claim in Part I—
namely, that the quality of urban infrastructure plays a central role in
supporting the rule of law. In Part II, we provide empirical support for our
claim, gathering data from 124 countries related to the quality of the urban
environment and the degree to which these countries are characterized as
having a strong or weak rule of law. Analysis of that data confirms that the
quality of a country’s urban infrastructure has a measurable impact on the rule
of law and that low quality urban infrastructure leads to a weakened rule of
law, not the other way around, as one might presume. In Part III, we chart a
course forward balancing the gains and losses of austerity at the local level. In
doing that, we also set a roadmap for subsequent discussion of the degree to
which sustained investment in infrastructure is a normative requirement of a
government invested in both a functioning social contract and the rule of law.

advocates an enforcement strategy that emphasizes the necessity of pervasive police presence and aggressive
misdemeanor arrest. See Wilson & Kelling, supra, at 34. This approach, however, overlooks that the negative
causal chain of events triggered by urban decay starts with the government’s abandonment of its obligations
under the social contract rather than individual rule defection. The cycle can thus be reversed only when the
government resumes its obligations to provide an adequate and livable urban environment. See infra Part I.B.3.
27 David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2549 & n.21 (2005) (“The
formulation of most states’ fiscal policies is guided by a combination of state constitutions’ fiscal rules . . . ,
state statutes, the state legislatures’ procedural rules, and traditions that shape the expectations of the major
players in budgetary affairs. . . . [The term] ‘fiscal constitutions,’ . . . refers to the combined effect of all these
restraints . . . .”); see also Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 863, 866 (2012)
(observing that states’ fiscal constitutions have historically included “constitutional debt limitations, balanced
budget mandates, public-purpose requirements, and other restrictions on debt and spending”).
28 See infra notes 200–05 and accompanying text.
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I. THE RULE OF LAW AND URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE
We theorize that the quality of the environment in which residents live
determines the degree to which the rule of law will take root and thrive. In
making this argument, we recognize that the relationship between the urban
environment and the rule of law is multifaceted, multidimensional, and
mediated through complex processes at both the individual and collective
level. Nevertheless, we suggest that the rule of law is the linchpin of the social
contract between citizens and civil society, and that adequate urban
infrastructure plays a highly visible and salient role in underpinning the rule of
law.
A. The Rule of Law and the Social Contract
In its abstract normative sense, the rule of law is a political ideal that is not
necessarily descriptive of any actual society.29 Moreover, the meaning of “rule
of law” is highly contested,30 with various interest groups using the phrase to
promote different—and often competing—agendas.31 Whatever the agenda, the
29 See JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY 210, 211 (2d ed. 2009) (“The rule of law is a political ideal which a legal system may lack or may
possess to a greater or lesser degree.”); Brent White, Putting Aside the Rule of Law Myth: Corruption and the
Case for Juries in Emerging Democracies, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 309 (2010).
30 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (stating that the precise meaning of the rule of law “may be less clear today than
ever before”); Frank Lovett, A Positivist Account of the Rule of Law, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 41, 41 (2002)
(“[D]escriptive accounts of the Rule of Law remain strikingly vague and imprecise.”); Margaret Jane Radin,
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 781 (1989) (noting that the rule of law ideal “is deeply
contested” and that we lack a “canonical formulation of its meaning”).
31 These agendas include the promotion of economic development, the protection of human rights,
equality and political liberty, and the spread of democracy. See Daniel B. Rodriguez et al., The Rule of Law
Unplugged, 59 EMORY L.J. 1455, 1456–57 (2010); see also Michael Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the
Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1308–09 (2001) (“[T]he descriptive
meaning of ‘the rule of law’ is dependent on the prescriptive meaning one ascribes to it; in the context of
complex contemporary polities there likely will be vigorous disagreements concerning the relevant
prescriptive standards at stake.”). Besides the conflict around the promotion of specific agenda, further
disagreement exists among advocates of a formal (or proceduralist) conception of the rule of law and
advocates of a substantive conception. See generally Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the
Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework, 1997 PUB. L. 467 (1997) (discussing each conception at length). For
the former, the rule law only encompasses procedural and institutional qualities, which should guide
lawmaking and law enforcement by public authorities. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 29, at 214 (“This is the basic
intuition from which the doctrine of the rule of law derives: the law must be capable of guiding the behaviour
of its subjects. It is evident that this conception of the rule of law is a formal one.”). Among others, the
qualities the rule of law should embody include the requirements that laws be general, public, prospective,
understandable, consistent, stable, and congruent. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46–91 (rev. ed.
1969) (discussing the rule of law with respect to these issues). On the contrary, for advocates of a substantive
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rule of law ideal almost always includes a normative commitment to the
“supremacy of law” over the arbitrary exercise of power (“the rule of men”).32
Hence, at a minimum, the term “rule of law” includes a commitment by public
officials and citizens to conform their behavior to legal rules and processes
rather than individualized or momentary whims.33
In this foundational sense, the rule of law stands at the heart of the social
contract, as articulated in the political philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau.34 Individuals consent to unite into civil society and embrace the rule
of law,35 without which they are to remain in the state of nature,36 wherein “the
rule of men” leads to destruction, chaos, and uncertainty. That is, the rule of
law is the means through which individuals replace “relations of hostility,”
which define the state of nature, with “relations of contract,” which constitutes
a civil society.37 The rule of law is thus consensual and contractual, both as it
applies to the horizontal dimension of social interactions among citizens—the

conception, the rule of law should be related to certain moral rights and duties of individual citizens and public
authorities, such as individual freedom and equality. Historically, the substantive conception of the rule of law
is associated with the work of the Austrian philosopher Friedrich Hayek. See F. A. HAYEK, THE POLITICAL
IDEAL OF THE RULE OF LAW (1955).
32 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 30, at 8–9 (arguing that the distinguishing feature of the rule of law is that
legal rules and processes, as opposed to other norms, guide people, including officials and judges, in their
actions); Rodriguez et al., supra note 31, at 1465 (“[T]he framework [of the rule of law] as it has been revisited
and refined over the centuries highlights the fundamental and normative point that a good legal system is
effective only insofar as individuals and officials are ruled by law, not men.”); Todd Zywicki, The Rule of
Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (“[T]he rule of law requires that
government action be ‘bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand.’” (quoting FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE
ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944))).
33 Andrew Venn Dicey, the Victorian scholar credited with introducing the term “rule of law,” was the
first to describe the supremacy of law as the basic requirement underpinning the rule of law. See A. V. DICEY,
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 180–205 (8th ed. 1915).
34 See supra note 15. However, in the elaboration of the Hobbesian social contract, the requirement to act
according to the law only applies to citizens, while the exercise of authority is conceived as unconstrained to
preserve the stability of civil society. See infra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
35 Consent to the rule of law, and the other institutions of civil society, does not require the actual
agreement of the social contractors, as that would be an unworkable requirement. See Rosenfeld, supra note
31, at 1316. What suffices to establish legitimacy of those institutions is the hypothetical ex ante agreement of
the social contractors, acting as rational individuals. John Rawls introduced the notion of the sufficiency of
hypothetical consent in social contract theory. See RAWLS, supra note 15, at 11–13.
36 In social contract theory, the state of nature is understood as the logical, rather than the historical,
antecedent of civil society: i.e., a dimension in which individuals are stripped of any social and political
relationship. See J. W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: A CRITICAL STUDY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT 4 (2d ed.
1957).
37 David Gauthier, The Social Contract as Ideology, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 130, 134 (1977).
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pactum unionis38—and the vertical dimension of social interactions between
citizens and government—the pactum subjectionis.39
1. Pactum Unionis and Pactum Subjectionis
Under the guarantee of the rule of law, each individual voluntarily reaches
agreements and associates with other individuals in the pactum unionis (the
“social contract proper” or “contract of association”)40 to bring order to social
interactions. The pactum unionis, however, is insufficient to build a
well-ordered society.
Despite their different takes on the concept of a social contract, Hobbes,
Locke, and Rousseau all believed that social order was consistently threatened
by the risk that a given individual may cease to voluntarily abide by the rules.41
In at least some circumstances, narrow self-interests will encourage individuals
to break the rules. If such rule breaking becomes the norm, however, the
pactum unionis is broken, as the commitment to act lawfully cannot be
sustained in the absence of a reciprocal commitment by others.42 In order to be
meaningful, legal norms and procedures require enforcement mechanisms and
a third party with enforcement authority.
This need for authority in civil society gives rise to an additional, vertical
dimension of social contracting: the pactum subjectionis between citizens and
government (the “contract of submission” or “contract of government”).43
Individuals voluntarily subsume their will to a centralized authority—the
government—who acts as a third party enforcer of their reciprocal promises to
abide by the law. While coercive government enforcement is costly to
citizens—who are required to give the government a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force and, as taxpayers, fund the government operations—
they are better off bearing collective enforcement cost than living without the
38 See W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 117–19 (5th ed. 1967) (defining the pactum unionis as the
process of building a society).
39 See id. (defining the pactum subjectionis as the process of structuring the exercise of power).
40 See GOUGH, supra note 36, at 2 (defining the “social contract proper” or “pacte d’association”).
41 See Rosenfeld, supra note 15, at 864–69.
42 Reciprocity in contracts requires that agreements are bargained for as “two-sided exchanges, and not
one-sided promises.” See P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 447 (1979). As
applied to the rule of law context, this implies that no voluntary commitment to act according to the law can
arise in the absence of similar commitments by others, as the lack of a “mutuall [sic] transferring of Right”
frustrates the transactional object of obtaining social order. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 68 (Everyman’s
Library ed., 1979) (1651).
43 See GOUGH, supra note 36, at 3 (defining the “contract of submission” or “contract of government”).
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rule of law. At the same time, the rule of law acts as an element that supports
the viability of the pactum subjectionis.44 The rule of law requires that certain
essential institutional arrangements—such as a basic constitutional structure, a
system of independent judicial review, and separation of powers—be in place
to prevent abuses of power by rulers and enforcers.45 To Juvenal’s question
“sed quis custodiet ipsos custodies?” (i.e., “who is to guard the guards
themselves?”),46 the answer is, again, the rule of law, which serves as a “rule
among rulers” in addition to a “rule among citizens.”47
The modern economic theory of public goods point outs an additional
raison d’être for the delegation of authority to the government under the
pactum subjectionis.48 There are essential goods and services—so-called
“public goods”—that individuals fail to supply. Typical examples include a
country’s internal and external security, health care, education, and—most
importantly for the purpose of this Article—urban infrastructure.49 The
common feature shared by all these goods is that their consumption is
nonexclusive. Once supplied, everyone will benefit from their existence, even
the free riders who did not contribute to their production.50 This disincentivizes
individuals from producing such goods, to the detriment of all.51 Thus, just as
rule enforcement requires the existence of a third party entity, so too does the
existence and maintenance of public goods require a third party coordinator.52
The additional role served by the government as provider of public goods
has important implications for the rule of law. As we explain below, by
44

FRIEDMANN, supra note 38, at 117–19.
See Rodriguez et al., supra note 31, at 1475–79.
46 See Juvenal, Satire VI, in JUVENAL AND PERSIUS 230, 266–67 (Susanna M. Braund ed. & trans., 2004)
(c. 117 C.E.); Juvenal, Satire 6: Roman Wives, in THE SATIRES 37, 50 (Niall Rudd trans., 1991) (c. 117 C.E.).
47 See W. IVOR JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 46 (5th ed. 1959).
48 On the relationship between social contract theory and public goods theory, see generally ANTHONY
DE JASAY, SOCIAL CONTRACT, FREE RIDE: A STUDY OF THE PUBLIC GOODS PROBLEM (1989).
49 See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
50 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
51 Viewed through the lens of game theory, the production of public goods is a classic case of Prisoner
Dilemma. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND
CLUB GOODS 13 (1986). All citizens would benefit from cooperation (i.e., contributing honestly toward the
provisions of public goods), but defection (i.e., not contributing or under-contributing to such goods) is the
dominant strategy for self-interested individuals. As a result, public goods are provided suboptimally, unless
corrective mechanisms are put in place. See id.
52 Rule enforcement (or civil order) itself can be regarded as a public good. See JASAY, supra note 48, at
3 (observing that “[w]hat Hobbes deduced from the preference for a single good—civil order—later theorists
have extended to any good from which an individual can benefit without contributing to the cost of producing
or maintaining it”). However, as we explain below, the dual role of the government as enforcer and provider of
public goods exhibits radically different transactional and informational features. See infra Part I.A.2.
45
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providing public goods, the government sustains a social equilibrium that
encourages rule abidance, making the rule of law, to an important extent,
self-enforceable.
2. Information, Coordination, and Enforcement
The dual role of government as public enforcer and provider of public
goods arises in transactional environments that have different informational
value. Coercive government enforcement is a necessary corrective to ensure
the viability of exchanges between self-interested individuals and to allow
them to contract with one another in a predictable environment. However, the
government’s spot intervention to remedy rule infractions is not informative of
“what others are doing”—the degree of adhesion to the pactum unionis. Firstly,
the government’s enforcement action may be information known only to the
individual being “punished,” in which case it has no informational value for
other individuals. Secondly, even if the government’s enforcement action is
publicly known, it only provides information on discrete deviations from the
pactum unionis. That information, however, is not a “sufficient statistic” for
individuals to form a belief as to whether most others are abiding by, or
deviating from, the rules.53
Unlike the public enforcement contract, the “public goods contract”54
between citizens and government involves reoccurring and long-term
exchanges, as the nature of such goods makes them crucial to an individual’s
well-being on a day-to-day basis throughout her life.55 This highly interactive
53 See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 122 n.21 (2006) (defining a “sufficient
statistic” as an observable variable that summarizes all the information in a sample about the desired
unobservable variable).
54 In this Article, the government–citizens exchange (i.e., the pactum subjectionis) is conceptualized as
involving two distinct, although interconnected, contracts: the public enforcement contract, involving the role
of the government as third-party enforcer of the relations among citizens, and the public goods contract,
involving the role of the government as provider of public goods.
55 See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the Urban Fringe,
55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1136–37, 1149–50 (2008) (suggesting that collective services affect the everyday life
of citizens through both affirmative and negative aspects, where the former involve essential citizens’ rights to
some services, including services to personal safety and health, and the latter include citizens’ rights to be free
from some disservices, such as air pollution, noise, and ground contamination). The shutdown of the U.S.
government in 2013 provided a vivid illustration of the effect that a sudden government’s failure to provide
public goods can have on citizens. See Lynn R. Goldman, Government Shutdown Harms the Public Health,
HUFFINGTON POST POLITICS (Oct. 11, 2013, 12:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lynn-r-goldman/
government-shutdown-harms_b_4084828.html (discussing effects of the recent shutdown on public health
services); Sam Hananel et al., 10 Ways a Government Shut Down Might Affect You—Even if You are Not a
Federal Worker, NBC WASHINGTON (Sept. 30, 2013, 1:31 PM), http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/
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exchange provides information about the degree of adhesion to the pactum
unionis. This is because the long-term production of public goods is premised
on the government’s ability to continuously coordinate individual contributions
to such goods and because maintenance of public goods sends signals that are
consistent with rule abidance by others. Hence, access to adequate public
goods signals to individuals that legal rules and institutions are meaningful. Put
differently, when the government fulfills its function of coordinating the
production and maintenance of public goods, individuals form a belief that
most others choose rule abidance over rule defection. This fosters an individual
sense that following the rules is valuable, encouraging patterns of “social
cooperation” in both the interaction with the government and with other
individuals.
A game-theoretic illustration helps to better understand the equilibria of the
social contract game and the role played by the government as provider of
public goods in determining such equilibria. We assume a simple world of two
individuals: Individual 1 and Individual 2, who are about to interact with each
other. Each individual has a choice between two strategies: Cooperate and
Defect. The strategy Cooperate can be interpreted as involving rule abidance.
The strategy Defect involves, instead, rule defection. Unlike the strategy
Defect, the strategy Cooperate demands the exercise of effort and, hence, is
more costly. Each individual cannot observe what the other individual does. In
order to compute optimal actions, we can thus represent the game between
Individual 1 and Individual 2 in its strategic form through the below payoff
matrix.56

10-Ways-a-Government-Shutdown-Might-Affect-You—Even-If-Youre-Not-a-Federal-Worker-225528942.
html (observing that services such as trash pickup, national parks, and building inspections may be put on hold
during a shutdown).
56 Strategic form games (or normal form games) model interaction between parties assuming that each
party plays simultaneously without knowing the actions of the other party. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL.,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 6–9 (1994). More specifically, the matrix of Figure 1 shows a two-player version
of the “Stag Hunt Game”: a strategic form game that game theorists use to illustrate the coordination issues
involved by social contracting. See KEN BINMORE, 1 PLAYING FAIR: GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT 120–21 (1994).
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Figure 1. Social Contract Game

The rows of the matrix represent Individual 1’s strategies. The columns of
the matrix represent Individual 2’s strategies. The four cells of the matrix
correspond to the possible outcomes of the game. The number on the left is
Individual 1’s payoff for the corresponding outcome of the game. The number
on the right is Individual 2’s payoff. Each Individual is assumed to seek to
maximize her expected payoff from the game. A cell in which both payoffs are
starred corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, wherein each Individual is then
simultaneously making the best response to the strategic choice of the other.57
As shown by the matrix, there are two equilibria for the game. Either both
Individuals choose Cooperate or they both choose Defect. When they
Cooperate (shown in the northeast cell), their payoff is positive. Indeed, when
individuals follow the rules, social welfare increases, for example because
there is less need for coercive enforcement. Each Individual’s effort is
rewarded with lower participation costs (e.g., lower taxation) and, hence, a net
benefit. When both Individuals Defect (shown in the southwest cell), their
payoffs are normalized to zero, as neither Individual exerts effort and, thus,
neither receives any benefits. The outcome (Cooperate, Defect) (shown in the
northwest and southeast cells respectively) is not an equilibrium because the
payoff of the Individual who chooses Cooperate is negative, as her costly
effort goes unrewarded when the other Individual chooses Defect and, hence,
result in a loss.

57

(1950).

See John F. Nash, Jr., Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games, 36 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 48, 49
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The government as provider of public goods acts as a correlation device
allowing the Individuals to coordinate toward one of the possible equilibria. It
does so by sending a public signal to each Individual about the likely strategy
of the other. Because the long-term production of public goods is premised on
the government’s ability to continuously coordinate individual efforts and
well-maintained public goods sends signals that are consistent with rule
abidance by others, when individuals observe adequate public goods, they are
led to assume that the other agreed to play Cooperate. Hence, each Individual
“trusts” the other, choosing Cooperate in their turn. In contrast, when the
government fails to provide or maintain public goods, each Individual is led to
assume that the other has chosen Defect and, hence, chooses Defect in her
turn.58
While social cooperation is an equilibrium outcome when the government
provides adequate public goods, the heterogeneous interests of citizens may
still lead to some rule defection out of the equilibrium path, to the detriment of
those following the rules. However, when most individuals are on a “good”
(i.e., cooperative) equilibrium,59 patterns of “social advocacy” are also likely to
develop in order to constrain rule defection. By social advocacy, we refer to
citizens’ monitoring both fellow citizens and public officials to ensure that they
behave lawfully and are held accountable to the law. In a good equilibrium,
incentives for social advocacy arise because individuals are motivated to
preserve the benefits of the social contract and free riding off the monitoring of
others is less likely to be profitable. Firstly, if a potential free rider has private
information about another individual’s rule breaking, and keeps that
information to herself, no one else will offer any social advocacy—making
free riding unprofitable to the potential free rider. Secondly, if someone’s rule
breaking is widely known, then the failure to socially disapprove the rule
breaking (i.e., attempting to free ride off the advocacy of others) will be also
widely known (i.e., the free rider will reveal her “type”),60 exposing her to
58 If the equilibrium (Defect, Defect) is identified with the state of nature, the agreement of the
individuals to play Cooperate can thus be seen as representing a social contract. See BINMORE, supra note 56,
at 121.
59 A good (Nash) equilibrium is one in which the sum of the utilities of all the players is maximized.
60 As standard in the adverse selection literature, “type” refers to the categorization of agents into “good”
and “bad” ones. An adverse selection problem arises when an agent has hidden knowledge of her
characteristics or value. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490 (1970) (introducing the adverse selection problem in its classic
form, described as the situation that arises when a seller does not know how much the buyer is willing to pay
for a good, i.e., the seller does not know whether the buyer’s “type” is good or bad). In the social advocacy
context, a good type engages in social advocacy, while a bad type free rides on the efforts of other.
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social sanctions and reputational losses.61 Thirdly, if the rule-breaking behavior
is public knowledge and no one engages in social advocacy, then individuals
have moved to a “bad” equilibrium, presumably, in this context, because the
government has failed to provide adequate public goods and hence to sustain
the conditions for cooperative patterns to develop.62
3. Virtuous and Vicious Cycles
The above game-theoretic account of social contracting suggests that the
rule of law is not just imposed from the top down through coercive government
enforcement. Rather, the government’s provision of adequate public goods
leads to a virtuous cycle in which incentives develop for “social
enforcement”—social cooperation and social advocacy—which strengthens the
rule of law.63
61 Individuals who sit idly by while others break rules are often punished by social advocates as much as
the rule breakers—think of the way people react to parents in a restaurant who do not restrain their children
from throwing tantrums. See Bruce L. Benson, Reciprocal Exchanges as the Basis for Recognition of Law:
Examples from American History, 10 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 53, 56 (1991) (arguing that community responses
to rule defection have historically involved ostracism and the loss of reputational capital).
62 As rule abidance breaks down, people have fewer incentives to engage in social advocacy. For
example, it makes sense for someone on a pristine street to call out a teenager who litters, as deterring this one
individual is likely to result in a completely clean street. However, there is no purpose served in scolding a
teenager who litters on a trash pile, as he is clearly only one of many. See infra notes 83–90 and accompanying
text (discussing these mechanisms in greater detail).
63 See Benson, supra note 61, at 53 (arguing that the law can also develop “from the ground,” as a result
of the “recognition of mutual benefits”); HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 274 (1983) (same); see also Ken Binmore, Reciprocity and the Social Contract, 3
POL., PHIL. & ECON. 5, 6 (2004) (describing the social contract as a repeated game and suggesting that “the
reciprocity mechanism allows a much wider range of behavior to be supported as an equilibrium in repeated
games than is generally thought”).
The distinction between coercive and social enforcement of the rule of law is reminiscent of the strand of
legal literature that emphasizes the importance of establishing a “rule of law culture” in addition to “rule of
law institutions.” The common idea shared by these studies is that in a proper culture of legality, individuals
take the legitimacy of law and legal institutions for granted, which aids to sustain the rule of law. See, e.g.,
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the “Rule of Law,” 101 MICH. L. REV.
2275, 2285, 2323 (2003) (discussing the role of culture in determining compliance with the law); Philip
Selznick, Legal Cultures and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE 21, 37 (Martin Krygier & Adam Czarnota eds., 1999) (emphasizing the
importance of a “culture of lawfulness” in the establishment of the rule of law); Brian Tamanaha, The History
and Elements of the Rule of Law, 2012 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 232, 246 (2012) (arguing that when the cultural
belief supporting the rule of law “is pervasive, the rule of law can be resilient, . . . . [w]hen this cultural belief
is not pervasive, the rule of law will be weak or nonexistent”). Along the same lines, Herbert Hart highlights
the importance of reciprocal recognition of legal rules, which takes place when such rules are accepted and
employed in general practice from an internal point of view rather than just an external (i.e., coercive) point of
view. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100–10 (3d ed. 2012). Gerard Postema similarly suggests that
the rule of law involves two main attributes: legality—“the formal, procedural, and institutional aspects of the
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By reducing the rate of rule defection, social enforcement mechanisms
simultaneously reduce the amount and cost of coercive government
enforcement. Such mechanisms also support coercive enforcement when
necessary (i.e., in the case of residual rule defection), sustaining it “from the
ground” and lowering the cost of effective governmental intervention. Indeed,
in economic terms, social and coercive enforcement of the rule of law are
“complementary goods with some substitute effects.”64 Thus, on the one hand,
a robust rule of law requires the support of both coercive and social
enforcement. On the other, the more effective social enforcement mechanisms
are, the less coercive enforcement is needed.65
Conversely, when the government fails to provide public goods, it creates a
vicious cycle, weakening the rule of law. When faced with the lack of (or
inadequate) public goods, individuals are led to believe that the government
and citizens as a collective have abandoned their commitment to follow the
basic rules governing the social contract. Individuals may choose, in turn, to
breach their own obligations toward both the government and each other.66 As
parties to the social contract—be they individuals or the government itself—
breach their obligations, obedience to the law loses its inherent value. Social
enforcement mechanisms (social cooperation and social advocacy) are lost.
This increases exponentially the costs of coercive enforcement, while at the
same time making it less effective—undermining the rule of law and
potentially breaking it down altogether.

ideal”—and fidelity—“a set of relationships and responsibilities rooted in core convictions and commitments,
which are essential for the realization of this ideal.” See Gerald J. Postema, Fidelity in Law’s Commonwealth,
in PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW (Dennis Klimchuck ed., forthcoming) (manuscript at 4), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294665. Unlike our account of social enforcement,
however, these accounts fail to explain why “a proper culture of legality,” or “fidelity” to the rule of law,
emerges in any given society.
64 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 441 (7th ed. 2015) (“In the real world, of
course, most goods are neither perfect substitutes (like nickels and dimes) nor perfect complements (like right
shoes and left shoes).”); see also id. at 70 (providing a general definition of complementary and substitute
goods).
65 See Hadfield & Weingast, supra note 23, at 33 (suggesting that many enforcement mechanisms can
replace coercive enforcement, including “decentralized collective punishment mechanisms that support any
normative social order such as social disapproval, withdrawal of cooperation or trade, and unilateral or
collective retaliation, as well as organized and official force”). Unlike Hadfield and Weingast, however, we do
not see social enforcement as a perfect substitute of coercive governmental enforcement.
66 Ken Binmore provides a vivid description of the retribution that may follow from the lack of
reciprocity in any given exchange. As he writes, “[p]eople provide a service to others expecting to get
something in return. As the saying goes, I’ll scratch your back if you’ll scratch mine. If the service a person
provides isn’t satisfactorily reciprocated, then the service will be withdrawn. Sometimes, some disservice will
be offered instead.” See KEN BINMORE, PLAYING FOR REAL: A TEXT ON GAME THEORY 319 (2007).
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B. The Man and the City
Among the several public goods the government is expected to provide to
citizens, we argue that urban infrastructure plays an especially salient role in
underpinning the rule of law. Urban infrastructure—including roads and
highways, electrical supply, water resources, air quality, public transportation
systems, traffic control, safe travel, and a pleasing overall aesthetic67—directly
and inescapably affects the daily lived experience of all citizens. A
well-maintained water supply, for example, avoids leakage and the associated
waste of natural and economic resources while also preventing the spread of
diseases.68 Good roadways69 and effective transit systems70 improve the local
economy, allowing people and goods to move efficiently.71 A sound
transportation system also improves community health by reducing traffic
congestion (and, hence, air pollution) and decreasing the likelihood of
accidents.72 Efficient electrical supply plays a similarly vital role in driving the
success of industrial processes, as well as ensuring the effective daily function
of individual households.73
These stylized illustrations help to explain why the quality of urban
infrastructure visibly expresses the degree of adhesion to the social contract by
67 This list is intended as exemplificative rather than illustrative of urban infrastructure components,
which also include, for example, sanitary systems, public facilities (e.g., libraries), and parks. The reason we
limit our exemplification to the above list of components is that those are the components for which we were
able to collect data in our cross-country analysis of urban infrastructure and the rule of law. See infra notes
166–68 and accompanying text.
68 See 2013 REPORT CARD, supra note 9, at 29 (attributing to the U.S. wastewater supply system an
overall grade of D (poor) and estimating a needed investment cost of $298 billion over the next 20 years).
69 See id. at 48–50 (attributing to the U.S. road system an overall grade of D (poor) and documenting an
estimated $101 billion cost in wasted time and fuel annually due to traffic congestion in many U.S. highways).
70 See id. at 7, 51–53 (attributing to the U.S. transit system an overall grade of D (poor) and remarking
that 45% of American households lack any access to transit).
71 See 2012 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 13, at 10 (“For example, in Chicago, transportation
agglomeration benefits have led to greater business clustering and economic growth associated with
manufacturing, as businesses took advantage of Chicago’s position in a national transportation network.”).
72 See id. (“[W]ell-maintained roads with adequate capacity, coupled with access to public transit and
other driving alternatives, can lower traffic congestion and accident rates which not only saves Americans time
and money but also saves lives.”); see also PEDRO ANTUNES ET AL., CONFERENCE BD. OF CAN., THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE IN ONTARIO 25 (2010), available at http://suma.org/
cmsupload/fckeditor/Research/10-144_EcomomicImpactPublicInfrastructure_WEB.pdf (observing that a
better road system lowers commuting time and improves personal health); David Alan Aschauer, Why Is
Infrastructure Important?, in IS THERE A SHORTFALL IN PUBLIC CAPITAL INVESTMENT?, at 21, 23 (Alicia H.
Munnell ed., Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series No. 34, 1990), available at https://www.
bostonfed.org/economic/conf/conf34/conf34b.pdf.
73 See 2013 REPORT CARD, supra note 9, at 8, 60–64 (attributing to the U.S. energy system an overall
grade of D+).
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both the government and individuals. When the government provides and
maintains adequate urban infrastructure, both households and communities at
large receive essential economic, environmental, health, and safety benefits.74
Such benefits provide a signal to individuals about the legitimacy and stability
of legal rules, as well as the polity’s shared commitment to abide by law.
Continued access to those benefits supports the development of social
enforcement, strengthening the rule of law. Conversely, when the government
fails to provide a livable urban environment, conflict replaces cooperation in
social interactions, and incentives for social advocacy are jeopardized,
ultimately undermining the rule of law.
The ensuing discussion analyzes the specific factors that may cause
inadequate urban infrastructure to result in the loss of social cooperation and
social advocacy. As explained in subsection I.B.1, in an unlivable urban
environment, unlawful behavior is not only likely to become socially common
but also socially approved. This, in turn, creates a risk that the disregard of one
rule may spread like a contagion infecting other rules, with the result that
doing what is practical in lieu of what is legal may become the new normal in
such an environment.75 Similarly, as discussed in subsection I.B.2, the loss of
the benefits arising from adequate urban infrastructure is likely to make it less
profitable for citizens to be civically engaged. Moreover, an unlivable urban
environment may reduce citizen access to the democratic process, with
negative consequences on citizens’ ability to exercise social advocacy. Finally,
in subsection I.B.3, we explain why increased coercive enforcement may only
compensate for the loss of social enforcement that is produced by inadequate
urban infrastructure up to a point, and why this conclusion sets our theory of

74

Influential research by David Aschauer and others has explored the link between public infrastructure
investment and economic growth since the late 1980s, finding evidence of large private sector productivity
gains from public infrastructure investments. See, e.g., David Alan Aschauer, Is Public Expenditure
Productive?, 23 J. MONETARY ECON. 177 (1989); David A. Aschauer, Public Investment and Productivity
Growth in the Group of Seven, 13 ECON. PERSP. 17 (1989); John G. Fernald, Roads to Prosperity? Assessing
the Link Between Public Capital and Productivity, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 619 (1999) (documenting a causal link
between infrastructure investments and productivity gains); Alicia H. Munnell, Infrastructure Investment and
Economic Growth, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1992, at 189, 195 (comparing the economic benefits of infrastructure
investments between regions in the United States, generally finding smaller but economically significant
benefits in comparison to Aschauer’s estimates). In addition, infrastructure investments have been found to
positively impact property values and, more generally, improve living standards. For a review of the studies
exploring the several benefits arising from adequate infrastructure investments, see 2012 TREASURY REPORT,
supra note 13, at 7–11.
75 See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
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the relationship between urban environment and the rule of law apart from the
popular broken windows theory (BWT) of deterrence.76
1. Urban Decay and Social Cooperation
Because urban infrastructure is a highly visible and salient public good, the
failure to provide such infrastructure—made tangible by “urban decay”77—
may jeopardize social cooperation along several dimensions. Urban decay
refers to the fundamental and long-lasting aspects of unrelenting physical
disorder such as boarded-up and abandoned buildings and public spaces,
potholed roads and overwhelming traffic congestion, broken playgrounds, and
poor (or no) access to clean water and basic sanitation.78 Minor forms of
physical disorder, e.g., piled trash and graffiti, may also be associated with
urban decay but are unlikely to determine it in isolation. At the same time, they
can more easily be remedied by spot interventions, rather than demanding
sustained investment in infrastructure.
The negative impact of urban decay on social cooperation can be observed
in the relationship between a government and its citizens—the pactum
subjectionis.79 As illustrated in the game in Figure 1 above,80 individuals faced
with urban decay may rationally lose interest in following the law, perceiving
that the government itself, as well as most others, have discarded rules. In
other words, urban decay serves as a heuristic used by individuals to conclude
that the government is not adequately fulfilling its function in coordinating the
production of public goods, as well as heuristic to conclude that other
individuals have ceased to adhere to the rules of the social contract. As a result,
the legitimacy of the government’s rules and institutions are weakened, and so
are individual incentives to choose patterns of rule abidance over patterns of
rule defection. In this context, dashing illegally across gaps in traffic in the
absence of adequate traffic control or protected crosswalks,81 parking illegally
76

See infra notes 122–39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 24.
78 See Malia Jones et al., Eyes on the Block: Measuring Urban Physical Disorder Through In-Person
Observation, 40 SOC. SCI. RES. 523, 524 (2011) (defining urban disorder as referring to “the conditions of
streets, sidewalks, building exteriors, and other characteristics visible to any passer-by”). As explained below,
by adopting a definition of urban decay that refers to the fundamental aspect of physical disorder, we aim to
limit the overlap between physical and social aspects of disorder. See infra notes 127–33 and accompanying
text.
79 See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
80 See supra Figure 1 and accompanying text.
81 See Tom Vanderbilt, In Defense of Jaywalking: Banning the Practice Won’t Make Pedestrians Safer,
SLATE (Nov. 2, 2009, 4:01 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/transport/2009/11/in_defense_of_
77
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on the sidewalks in the absence of legal parking,82 ignoring red lights to get
across gridlocked intersections, or littering where there are no trash cans may
all become socially common behaviors.
Sociological studies documenting the influence that the urban environment
has upon an individual’s behavior and cognitive process83 are consistent with
our game-theoretic account of social contracting. These studies highlight that
unlawful conduct—as well as other forms of rule defection—not only may
become socially common but also socially approved in a decayed urban
environment. The distinction between “common” and “approved” behaviors
derives from the sociological concepts of “descriptive norms” and “injunctive
norms.” As explained by sociologist Robert Cialdini, “[t]he descriptive norm
describes what is typical or normal. It is what most people do, and it motivates
by providing evidence as to what will likely be effective and adaptive
action.”84 The injunctive norm, instead, specifies “what ought to be done”85
relative to all sort of legitimate rules, including legal rules.86 Most importantly
jaywalking.2.html (suggesting that jaywalking emerges as a response to the lack of protected crosswalks and
pedestrian-friendly engineering). The enforcement of anti-jaywalking laws in the United States is typically
sporadic. Thus, last year’s attempt by the Los Angeles police to enforce stricter anti-jaywalking rules (and
penalties) made headlines. See Aidan Lewis, Jaywalking: How the Car Industry Outlawed Crossing the Road,
BBC NEWS MAG. (Feb. 11, 2014, 19:13 ET), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-26073797. Consistent with
this Article’s thesis, those headlines were followed by a report of the Los Angeles 2020 Commission that
presented a worrying catalogue of structural city failings, including “widespread poverty and job stagnation,
huge municipal pension obligations, a struggling port and tourism industry and paralyzing traffic.” See Adam
Nagourney, Report Finds Los Angeles at Risk of Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/04/10/us/report-finds-a-los-angeles-in-decline.html.
82 See Karl Soper, Russia: Moscow’s Peculiar Illegal Parking Problem, GLOBAL VOICES (Aug. 31, 2012,
15:41 GMT), http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/08/31/russia-the-peculiarities-of-national-parking/ (“Moscow
drivers . . . . are used to parking illegally on streets, and blocking traffic . . . . In neighborhoods, they block
alleys into courtyards, and impede movement of emergency vehicles. . . . [D]rivers defend their behavior by
arguing that Moscow’s buildings, apartments, and other infrastructure were built with little parking.”).
83 See Timothy J. Haney, “Broken Windows” and Self-Esteem: Subjective Understandings of
Neighborhood Poverty and Disorder, 36 SOC. SCI. RES. 968, 969 (2007) (“Sociological research dating to the
early 1900s documents the influence that a city has upon an individual’s behavior and cognitive processes.”).
84 Robert Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to
Reduce Littering in Public Spaces, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1015 (1990) [hereinafter
Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory]; see also Robert Cialdini et al., The Transsituational Influence of Social
Norms, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 104, 104 (1993) [hereinafter Cialdini et al., Transsituational
Influence]. The concept of descriptive norm is reminiscent of the category of “conformity” employed in the
psychology literature and defined as “the tendency to copy the most prevalent behavior in a population [which]
is particularly a strong and robust predictor of human behavior.” See Jeffrey P. Carpenter, When in Rome:
Conformity and the Provision of Public Goods, 33 J. SOCIO-ECON. 395, 395 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
85 Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory, supra note 84, at 1015.
86 In his original formulation of injunctive norms, Cialdini had mostly moral imperatives in mind. See
Cialdini, Transsituational Influence, supra note 84, at 104 (defining injunctive norms as specifying “what
people approve and disapprove within the culture and motivate action by promising social sanctions for

WSM GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

9/18/2014 10:35 AM

URBAN DECAY

23

for the purpose of this discussion, under what is known as the “Cialdini
effect,”87 injunctive norms are found to be more effective when accompanied
by consistent descriptive norms.88 The classic example is littering, where an
antilittering (injunctive) norm will be more likely to deter littering when it
operates in a non-littered rather than a pre-littered setting.89
As applied to our analytical framework, injunctive norms consist of the
collective expectation that people will abide by the rules in order to create an
ordered society. Descriptive norms are the degree to which citizens actually
engage in the appropriate behavior. Under the Cialdini effect, it is easy to see
why the government’s failure to provide a livable urban environment leads
citizens to breach the rules. Because injunctive norms are less likely to be
internalized by individuals in circumstances of urban decay, their violation will
be less costly, as social retribution is unlikely to sanction unlawful behavior in
these circumstances. The result is that injunctive norms will be more often
misaligned with descriptive norms. Thus, in an urban environment with no
trash cans, the descriptive norm will tend to include littering, as social
retribution is unlikely to sanction this conduct regardless of the antilittering
injunctive norm.90
More generally, individuals who live in a decaying urban environment
must necessarily develop adaptive behavioral patterns, many of which are
likely to involve routine legal transgressions. They will also tend to develop
attitudes that justify and normalize their actions. For example, if, in the
absence of adequate traffic control or protected crosswalks, the safest way to
cross the street is to dash illegally across gaps in traffic, a pedestrian is unlikely
to believe that jaywalking is wrong because it is illegal. Rather, the pedestrian
will discount the persuasiveness of the injunctive norm against jaywalking in
normative or counternormative conduct”). More recent studies, however, have applied the concept of
injunctive norms to a wider range of rules, including legal rules. See Kees Keizer et al., The Spreading of
Disorder, 322 SCIENCE 1681, 1682 (2008).
87 See Keizer et al., supra note 86, at 1682.
88 See id. at 1682 (“Injunctive-norm information in a persuasive message is more effective when
accompanied by descriptive norm information that is in alignment rather than in conflict with that message.”
(internal citations omitted)).
89 See Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory, supra note 84, at 1019; see also Susan M. Reiter & William
Samuel, Littering as a Function of Prior Litter and the Presence of the Absence of Prohibitive Signs, 10 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 45, 45 (1980) (showing that prior exposure is an important variable in determining the
effectiveness of antlittering signs).
90 See Benno Torgler et al. Environmental and Pro-Social Norms: Evidence on Littering, 9 B.E. J. ECON.
ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 1 (2009) (demonstrating that the perceived littering behavior by others influences either
one’s own littering or non-littering behavior).
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favor of a belief that one should do what is practical to get safely across the
street. As other pedestrians follow suit, the reciprocity necessary to support the
injunctive norm against jaywalking is undermined and jaywalking emerges as
the new descriptive norm.
Moreover, as highlighted by a 2008 Science article, widespread and highly
visible disregard of one injunctive norm in favor of a descriptive norm of doing
what is practical can evolve into generalized disregard of other injunctive
norms, a process referred to as “cross-norm inhibition effect.”91 Hence, a
decaying urban environment is likely to lead to more than merely minor legal
transgressions, like jaywalking, but will spread like a contagion infecting other
injunctive norms.92 In such an environment, paying a bribe or otherwise
attempting to leverage political, social, or economic influence may likewise
become socially accepted behaviors that are justified because they are seen as
nothing less than a practical way to get things done.93
More critically, urban decay may act as a cue that “incivility” has replaced
social order in one’s relationship to fellow citizens94—the pactum unionis.95
The urban environment provides a signal as to whether others are committed to
a pattern of rule abidance or rule defection. When individuals are surrounded
by physical disorder, the signal tells them that others will more easily lean
toward rule defection, as the conditions for rule abidance are jeopardized by
the law devaluing induced by urban decay. This, in turn, reduces the likelihood
of cooperative patterns in the horizontal dimension of social contracting, as

91

See Keizer et al., supra note 86, at 1682.
See id.
93 It is worth observing that, on the one hand, doing what is practical is more likely to coincide with rule
abidance in an ordered urban environment. For example, in an environment with protected crosswalks and
adequate traffic control, crossing a road legally is likely to be more practical than jaywalking. On the other
hand, citizens will tend to be more willing to sustain the cost of doing what is impractical in an ordered
environment, because of the value they place in supporting the social contract.
94 See Albert Hunter, Private, Parochial and Public Social Orders: The Problem of Crime and Incivility
in Urban Communities, in THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CITIZENSHIP AND INSTITUTION BUILDING IN
MODERN SOCIETY 230, 230–42 (Gerald D. Suttles & Mayer N. Zald eds., 1985) (associating visible evidence
of urban disorder with “incivility”); Neelkamal Rastogi, Role of Social Disorder-Related Environmental Cues
as Signals in Modulating Social Learning, Norm Non-Compliance and Collective Decisions in Human
Societies, 99 CURRENT SCI. 1046, 1049 (2010) (“Disorder-related visual and acoustic signals from group
members and even from human-generated environmental cues are presumably perceived as indicators of
non-compliance of social norms.”); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social
Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 604
(1999) (observing that physical disorder has “long been noted as central to a neighborhood’s public
presentation”).
95 See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
92
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individuals condition their compliance with legal norms on reciprocal
compliance by others. That is, to the extent that urban physical disorder serves
as demonstrative evidence that others do not follow legal rules, it may make
individuals less willing to constrain their behavior in accordance with such
rules whenever rule compliance is personally costly.
2. Urban Decay and Social Advocacy
In addition to jeopardizing social cooperation, physical disorder also
decreases the likelihood that individuals will engage in social advocacy by
monitoring other individuals and public officials and holding them accountable
to the law. As discussed above, social advocacy is essential to the social
enforcement of the rule of law.96 However, effective social advocacy requires
both incentives for civic engagement and access to the democratic process.
Urban decay undermines both.
Under our game-theoretic account of social contracting, incentives for
social advocacy arise on the equilibrium path when most social contractors
prefer rule abidance to rule defection.97 Under this “good” equilibrium (i.e., the
Cooperate, Cooperate equilibrium of the game represented in Figure 1
above),98 engaging in social advocacy and sanctioning rule defection is likely
to be profitable to social contractors. However, the government’s failure to
provide public goods moves social contractors to a “bad” equilibrium (i.e., the
Defect, Defect equilibrium of the game represented in Figure 1 above).99 Under
this opposite equilibrium, social advocacy is no longer profitable, as most
social contractors prefer rule defection to rule abidance.
Consistent with our game-theoretic account of social contracting, urban
sociologists have long suggested that urban decay negatively correlates with
“collective efficacy”: a citizen’s belief in her ability to exercise influence over
events that affect her life.100 Individuals who live daily amidst unrelenting
physical disorder are more likely to feel impotent, unable to control the events

96

See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59 (providing a definition of good (Nash) equilibrium).
98 See supra Figure 1 and accompanying text.
99 See id.
100 See Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 94, at 612–13 (defining “collective efficacy” as “the linkage
of cohesion and mutual trust with shared expectations for intervening in support of neighborhood social
control”); see also ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE
THEORY 391 (1986) (defining perceived efficacy as “people’s judgments of their capabilities to organize and
execute courses of action required to attain designated types of performances”).
97
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around them.101 They are more likely to be “subjectively alienated” from other
citizens and their own communities.102 Confronted constantly with disorder,
such individuals perceive that they are powerless to effect change in their
surroundings, much less to effect change in the behavior of fellow citizens and
government officials.103 This tends to translate into higher levels of social
mistrust.104 As a result of these combined effects, individuals who live in
decaying urban environments are less likely to be civically engaged and
participate in social groups, volunteer organizations, or political meetings.105
At the extreme, they may even give up voting and other forms of democratic
involvement.
In a recent study of unincorporated urban areas, Michelle Anderson
suggests an additional channel through which urban decay can negatively
impact social advocacy: the creation of physical barriers that jeopardize both
the exercise of political voice and the access to participatory democracy.106

101

See Haney, supra note 83, at 970 (arguing that signs of dilapidation or decay “often translate into
feelings of fatalism”); Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 94, at 612–13 (“One is unlikely to take action in a
neighborhood context where the rules are unclear and people mistrust one another.”).
102 See Karlyn J. Geis & Catherine E. Ross, A New Look at Urban Alienation: The Effect of Neighborhood
Disorder on Perceived Powerlessness, 61 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 232, 233 (1998) (arguing that living in decay and
disorder can lead to “subjective alienation . . . [the] learned, generalized expectation that outcomes of
situations are determined by forces external to oneself” (internal citations omitted)).
103 See id. at 238 (“Neighborhood disorder in turn is associated with high perceived powerlessness.”);
Townsand Price-Spratlen & Wayne A. Santoro, Neighborhood Disorder and Individual Community Capacity:
How Incivilities Inform Three Domains of Psychosocial Assessment, 31 SOC. SPECTRUM 579, 583 (2011)
(reporting that “disorder increases residents’ feelings of powerlessness, mistrust of their neighbors, and
depressive symptoms” (internal citations omitted)); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing
Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows”, 67 SOC. PSYCHOLOGY Q.
319, 319 (2004) (“[C]oncept of disorder has penetrated social psychology. . . . For example, a number of
recent studies have linked perceived disorder to physical decline, depression, psychological distress, and
perceived powerlessness.” (internal citations omitted)).
104 See Catherine E. Ross et al., Powerlessness and the Amplification of Threat: Neighborhood
Disadvantage, Disorder, and Mistrust, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 568, 579–80 (2001) (“Neighborhood disorder is
associated with mistrust. Moreover, perceived neighborhood disorder produces more mistrust among those
who feel powerless to control their lives than among those with a sense of personal control.” (internal citations
omitted)).
105 See Cathy J. Cohen & Michael C. Dawson, Neighborhood Poverty and African American Politics, 87
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 286, 290–91 (1993) (showing that in decaying Detroit neighborhoods even those who are
not poor are less likely to participate in voluntary social groups and political organizations); Haney, supra note
83, at 973 (discussing earlier studies showing that neighborhood decay decreases “civic engagement”);
Price-Spratlen & Santoro, supra note 103, at 583 (“[D]isorder is negatively related to both community-focused
cognitions such as satisfaction or sense of community, and to behaviors such as citizen participation in
community organizations and informal neighboring.”).
106 See Anderson, supra note 55, at 1157–58. Residents of unincorporated urban areas face additional
barriers that may reduce their political voice, such as dilution effects arising out of issues of geographical
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Unincorporated urban areas are primarily low-income residential
neighborhoods lying outside the borders of an incorporated city.107 These
neighborhoods can be grouped consistently into two categories. The first
“lacks one or more vital service, such as piped, potable water; sewage and
wastewater disposal; adequate law enforcement and fire protection; street
paving, lighting, and traffic control; and/or flood and stormwater control.”108
The second, and largely overlapping, category “face health risks and depressed
land values due to a concentration of a metropolitan area’s undesirable land
uses, contamination from past land uses, or uncontrolled vulnerability to
natural disaster.”109 Hence, unincorporated urban areas offer a tangible, and
widespread,110 example of decaying urban environments in today’s America.
In these environments, residents face not only a sense of persistent political
disempowerment but also physical barriers that constrain their ability to take
part in the democratic process. For example, the lack of an adequate public
transportation system, coupled with the scarce economic resources of residents
and geographic dispersion, may prevent access to governmental institutions
and, hence, collective monitoring of those institutions.111
In spite of their differences, each of the above accounts share a common
conclusion: a decaying urban environment undermines citizens’ incentives to
engage in social advocacy, with the result that unlawful conduct by both fellow
citizens and public officials is less likely to be detected or sanctioned.112
dispersion and oversized county government. See id. at 1157. Those issues, however, remain outside the scope
of this Article’s investigation.
107 See id. at 1101.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1101–02.
110 See id. at 1095 (observing that “[a]cross the country, millions of low-income households live in [such]
urban enclaves”).
111 See id. at 1157. As observed by Anderson, this is the case of North Richmond, California, an
unincorporated urban area that is
less than five miles away from City Hall in Richmond, but its residents must drive more than an
hour to reach the county seat, which is located in a different city, to attend the meetings of their
governing Board of Supervisors. Such a distance is no small barrier for low-income residents
reliant on public transportation in a clogged metropolitan area.
Id. at 1157–58 (footnote omitted).
112 The difficulties that are often experienced in building anticorruption schemes in developing countries
are hardly surprising if one considers that those countries often exhibit widespread urban decay. As observed
by one commentator, “[a]ny anti-corruption scheme, to be successful, must involve the civil society, the
ultimate victims of corruption.” Okechukwu Oko, Subverting the Scourge of Corruption in Nigeria: A Reform
Prospectus, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 397, 465 (2002). But if those victims are engaged in surviving daily
and assaultive urban physical disorder, they are less likely to have the resources, and the incentives, to be
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3. Strict Coercive Enforcement and the Broken Windows Theory
With the loss of both social cooperation and social advocacy, social
enforcement becomes virtually non-existent. As a result, preservation of the
rule of law is left to coercive mechanisms.113 Without support from the bottom,
however, such mechanisms require vastly increased coercive force to maintain
social order, which poses several concerns. For one thing, an increase in the
government’s enforcement power may increase the room for public official
misconduct and other abuses of power. Indeed, the demand for a “stronger
government” calls to mind Hobbesian justifications for preferring forms of
absolute government to a democratic system.114 For Hobbes, given the
inherently unstable nature of society,115 only the attribution of absolute power
could prevent self-interested individuals from going back to a “state of war.”116
It is no coincidence that it is this strain of Hobbesian political thought that has
suffered the greatest criticism.117 Taken to its logical extreme, Hobbes’s
argument suggests that the law applies only to citizens and not to rulers. As a
result, “the enforcer may be free to infringe upon relations of contract and
render them equally uncertain,”118 contradicting the basic reason for the
delegation of enforcement authority to the government. Although in modern
democracies institutional safeguards exist precisely to prevent official abuse,119
expanding the government’s coercive power still carries an intrinsic risk of
increased government abuse and misconduct.
Additionally, strict coercive enforcement requires citizens to bear higher
costs to preserve a pattern of rule abidance over a pattern of rule defection. In a
decaying urban environment such costs might well become so high as to make
effective enforcement unfeasible. As discussed above, in such an environment,
citizens develop adaptive behavioral patterns that often involve a
meaningfully involved in the fight against corruption. See also infra Part II.B–C (documenting that a country’s
urban decay results in higher perceived corruption).
113 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between social enforcement
and coercive enforcement).
114 See HOBBES, supra note 42, at 189 (“Subjects owe to [their] Soveraigns [sic], simple Obedience, in all
things, wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the Lawse [sic] of God . . . .”).
115 See THOMAS HOBBES, The Citizen: Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, in
MAN AND CITIZEN 87, 234 (Bernard Gert ed., Charles T, Wood, T. S. K. Scott-Craig & Bernard Gert trans.,
1972) (1642).
116 See id.
117 See J. A. Thomas, Some Contemporary Critics of Thomas Hobbes, 26 ECONOMICA 185, 186–91
(1929).
118 See Rosenfeld, supra note 15, at 895.
119 See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
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transformation of unlawful conduct into socially accepted behaviors.120 Norm
contagion escalates this process, potentially leading a critical mass of
individuals to engage in a wide range of illegal transgressions on a regular
basis.121 Faced with such widespread rule defection, even strict coercive
enforcement may fail to ensure the rule of law. Thus, increased coercive
enforcement can compensate for the loss of social enforcement only up to a
point. Beyond that point, the rule of law begins to break down, with potentially
enormous negative social consequences.
This account of the limits of coercive enforcement also casts a doubt on the
“broken windows theory,” and its rationale for “zero tolerance” policing
policies. The BWT suggests that minor signs of social and physical disorder, if
left unattended, may induce additional disorder, including serious crime122—
hence providing a justification for a policy of strict rule enforcement,123 which
has been adopted in several cities worldwide124 since the theory’s formulation
in the early 1980s.125
Under both our own theory and the BWT, physical signs of disorder
provide the tipping point triggering a vicious cycle of increased disorder and
illegality.126 However, the similarity stops there, as the two theories are
otherwise both positively and normatively distinct.

120

See supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
122 See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 26.
123 See Bernard Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of
Deterrence, The Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV.
291, 294 (1998) (observing that the BWT has offered the ground for the development of the so-called “new
path of deterrence,” which is “a loosely grouped set of initiatives in the area of crime and punishment, ranging
from order-maintenance policing to curfews, gang-loitering laws, informal public-space zoning, reverse stings,
and shaming penalties”).
124 See Keizer et al., supra note 86, at 1681 (“[A]pproaches based on the BWT have become popular and
have been adopted worldwide (e.g., in various cities in the United States, Great Britain, Netherlands,
Indonesia, and South Africa).”).
125 The original BWT essay by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling appeared in the Atlantic Monthly
in 1982. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 26.
126 The BWT, as our theory, is grounded on earlier sociological theories of urban decay and social
contagion. See Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 26, at 281. However, unlike the BWT, our theory is based on
the investigation of what causes disorder. From a normative viewpoint the difference is substantial, as we draw
normative implications from the elaboration of the causes of disorder rather than the mere evidence of
disorder.
121
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From a positive perspective, the BWT addresses, by its very definition,
minor signs of disorder, such as noise, littering, and trash in vacant lots.127 In
contrast, our definition of physical disorder essentially refers to the
fundamental and long-lasting aspect of urban decay, such as major
deterioration of buildings, public spaces, roads, and water/sanitation systems.
The difference is nontrivial, as minor signs of physical disorder tend to overlap
with manifestations of social disorder. That is, they tend to be the product of
“the accumulated series of behaviors of local residents,”128 rather than the
result of underinvestment in urban infrastructure. The BWT also explicitly
associates physical disorder with social disorder (including loitering, drug use
and sale, vandalism, gang activity, and public drinking), considering both as
concurrent sources of urban decay.
The BWT’s implicit and explicit association of physical disorder to social
disorder has important conceptual implications.129 As aptly observed by
Bernard Harcourt, the BWT is analytically grounded on a pervasive dichotomy
between “orderly” and “disorderly” individuals,130 with these categories
assumed to “have a pre-existent fixed reality.”131 While Harcourt challenges
this approach suggesting that “the category of the disorderly is itself a reality
produced by the method of policing” supported by the BWT,132 we suggest that
the categories of “orderly” and “disorderly” have already broken down once
the city is in disarray. Once the government itself behaves in a “disorderly”
fashion, then the definition of “orderly” breaks down and illegality becomes

127 The account of physical disorder appearing in Wilson’s and Kelling’s original formulation of the BWT
is more evocative than descriptive. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 26, at 32 (identifying the emergence of
physical disorder in the following chain of events: “[a] piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a
window is smashed”). Subsequent empirical studies of the BWT, however, have precisely identified the
components of minor physical disorder in order to verify the association between the level of disorder and the
level of crime. See, e.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND COMMUNITY DECLINE: FINAL REPORT TO THE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 18 (1987); WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE
SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 104 (1990) (reproducing the result of 1987 report).
128 Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 26, at 282.
129 From an empirical perspective, it has been observed that conflating social disorder variables with
physical disorder variables might bias the analysis of the dependent variable crime, as some social disorder
variables, such as drug use and sale, capture major crimes in themselves. See, e.g., Sampson & Raudenbush,
supra note 94, at 608.
130 See Harcourt, supra note 123, at 297.
131 Id.
132 Id. For Harcourt, “[t]he techniques of punishment that comprise the quality-of-life initiative create the
disorderly person as an object of suspicion, surveillance, control, relocation, micromanagement, and arrest.”
Id. at 298.
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the norm. There are no longer “orderly” citizens when the government itself is
disordered.133
From a normative perspective, our theory radically departs from the BWT.
Based on the presumptive existence of a causal link between minor disorder
and serious crime, the BWT advocates a policy of strict coercive enforcement.
It emphasizes the necessity of pervasive police presence in urban communities
and a high arrest rate, combined with other aggressive enforcing
techniques134—an enforcement strategy referred to as “order maintenance
policing” or “quality-of-life initiative.”135 This approach, however, overlooks
the fact that social and coercive enforcement only are substitutes to a limited
and imperfect extent. Harcourt’s examination of the effects of the
quality-of-life initiative New York City adopted in the 1990s supports our
argument.136 Consistent with our predictions, he found that New York’s
quality-of-life initiative coincided with a sharp increase in complaints of police
133 Further, the BWT directly links minor physical and social disorder with violent crimes. We argue,
instead, that under conditions of urban decay and visible lawlessness, conflict prevails over cooperation in
social interactions, frustrating the conditions of reciprocal compliance that are indispensable to support a
robust rule of law. This lack of reciprocity might easily induce citizens to pay a bribe or adopt behaviors that
lead to various unlawful conducts, but is less likely to include murder, rape, or other violent crimes—as such
crimes involve breaking injunctive norms of an entirely different order. In addition, earlier studies that
investigated the causal relation between physical disorder and violent crimes have found only a loose
correlation between the two, making it uncertain whether violent crime occurs as a result of minor social
disorder, or other concurrent factors, such as income inequality or racial diversity. See, e.g., Keizer et al.,
supra note 86, at 1681 (“[R]esearch on the BWT has so far been correlational, so conclusions about causality
are shaky.” (internal citations omitted)); Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 94, at 603 (“Contrary to the
‘broken windows’ theory, . . . the relationship between public disorder and crime is spurious except perhaps
for robbery.”); Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 103 at 336 (documenting that perceptions of social
disorder are influenced by “neighborhoods’ racial, ethnic, and class composition”). Part II below aims to
address similar concerns that may arise with respect to our own theory.
134 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder
in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 461 (2000); Harcourt, supra note 123, at 302, 330; Debra
Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New
Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 553–56 (1997) (providing vivid examples of the policing strategies aimed at
reducing urban disorder that were used throughout the United States during the 1990s).
135 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 134, at 551.
136 See Harcourt, supra note 123, at 331–39, 377–84. For additional discussions of New York’s quality of
life initiative, see also Livingston, supra note 134, at 590, 605, 639–40; Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community
Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the
Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1271–77 (2000). For an examination of order maintenance policing strategies at
national level, see GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 199–
200 (1999), which discusses the effects of “get-tough” policing strategies on community building efforts in
America’s urban centers. It is also worth noting that New York’s newly elected major Bill de Blasio has
recently rehired William J. Bratton, the principal architect of 1990s quality-of-life initiative, to head the
NYPD. See Lauren Kirchner, Breaking Down the Broken Windows Theory, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 7, 2014, 4:00
AM), http://www.psmag.com/navigation/politics-and-law/breaking-broken-windows-theory-72310/.
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brutality and other forms of officer misconduct.137 He similarly found that law
enforcement costs rose exponentially under that policing strategy, both in
economic and social terms.138 At the same time, he cast doubt on whether the
huge costs New York citizens were required to bear could be credited with
having exerted any direct impact on the reduction in crime rates New York
experienced in those years.139
Our theoretical analysis of the relationship between urban decay and the
rule law suggests that a better approach to address the consequences of urban
disorder would start with an investigation of the reasons that produced the
government’s failure to provide public goods in the first place. Only when that
underlying problem is identified can effective remedies be identified. Before
proceeding to articulate any such remedies, however, it seems necessary to
operationalize our own theory so as to avoid being exposed to the criticism of
building normative considerations on an untested hypothesis.
II. EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION
The previous Part explained that the urban environment plays a highly
salient role in underpinning the rule of law. The provision by the government
of a livable urban environment signals to individuals that legal rules and
institutions are meaningful, and that most others are committed to abide by the
law. This fosters an individual sense that following the rules is valuable,
promoting both social cooperation and social advocacy. Under these
conditions, social enforcement supports coercive government enforcement of
the rule of law, with the result that the rule of law becomes stronger.140 In
contrast, when the government fails to provide a livable environment, citizens
infer that both the government and fellow citizens have reneged on their
obligations under the social contract. Hence, people are induced to abandon
cooperative patterns in favor of a counter pattern of conflict in both their
interactions with the government and with fellow citizens. The social
enforcement of the rule of law is lost, contributing to a downward spiral that

137

See Harcourt, supra note 123, at 378–80.
See id. at 298–99, 381–84 (reporting that misdemeanor arrest had a disproportionate impact on
minorities, and that the number of arrests rose by fifty percent with huge increase in out-of-pocket expenses).
139 See id. at 332, 335–37 (observing that the falling-crime trend in 1990s New York ran parallel to the
natural waning of the crack epidemic that had ravaged the city in the years before).
140 See supra Part I.A.3.
138
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exponentially increases the cost of preserving social order and weakens the
rule of law.141
In this Part, we empirically test the claim that the quality of a country’s
urban infrastructure impacts the strength of the rule of law. To this end, we
gathered data from 124 countries related to the quality of the urban
environment and the degree to which these countries are characterized by a
robust rule of law, as represented by an index of perceived corruption.
Consistent with prior empirical studies that have attempted to measure the rule
of law, we engage in a cross-country analysis on the assumption that the rule of
law “captures something of universal applicability.”142 As discussed above, at
its core the rule of law includes a commitment by public officials and citizens
to obey the law because it is the law.143 To this extent, the rule of law
embodies a cluster of values that goes beyond national borders and cultures,
justifying attempts at cross-country analyses.
The ensuing empirical analysis shows that the strength of a country’s rule
of law and the quality of its urban infrastructure are positively correlated. More
importantly—and consistent with our theoretical analysis—it reveals that a
decaying urban environment is likely the cause of the weakening of the rule of
law, and not the other way around, as some might presuppose.
A. Data and Empirical Methodology
In examining the impact of urban infrastructure on the rule of law, we
begin by collecting data from the Gallup World View’s Institutions and
Infrastructure database.144 The Gallup database gathers survey data that
measure residents’ satisfaction with the general quality of everyday life in their
community, including various types of urban infrastructure such as roads and
highways, water, air, public transportation systems, and overall “city
beauty.”145 In addition, we used data from the World Health Organization
(WHO)’s Global Status Report on Road Safety 2009 on the number of
141

See id.
Rodriguez et al., supra note 31, at 1463.
143 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
144 The
Gallup WorldView, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/157244/gallupworldview.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2014). Gallup is a research-based global consulting company, which
conducts public opinion polls worldwide on a variety of issues, including law and order, food and shelter,
institutions and infrastructure, jobs, and well-being. See Who We Are, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/careers/
108199/who.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2014).
145 Appendix Table 2 defines all variables and provides a list of Gallup’s survey questions used to
evaluate the satisfaction of residents with urban infrastructure.
142
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pedestrian deaths per capita, which we use as a proxy for traffic disorder,146
consistent with earlier empirical studies documenting a significant correlation
between pedestrian deaths and the degree to which people follow traffic
rules.147 We then averaged indexes from the Gallup database and the WHO
database to develop an index of urban infrastructure, which we call URBAN.148
Higher scores on URBAN are associated with higher quality urban
infrastructure.
Next, in order to measure the strength of the rule of law, we use the
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) provided by the Transparency
International database.149 The CPI estimates community perceptions of the
level of a country’s corruption based on interviews with businesspeople and a
standard definition of corruption involving the abuse of office for private
gain.150 Higher scores on the CPI are associated with lower levels of
corruption.151 Of course, the CPI cannot capture the individual frustration of
citizens, but it does capture the informed views of analysts, businesspeople,
and experts on both business and government corruption. To this extent, we
see the CPI as a reasonably reliable measure of perceived corruption in a
country.
We recognize that finding a suitable measure for the rule of law is a
challenging task. Existing studies have mostly employed multiple measures
with the aim of capturing the many components of the rule of law.152 Among
others, these components include a country’s system of checks and balances,
judicial independence, human security and human rights protection, and
146 WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL STATUS REPORT ON ROAD SAFETY: TIME FOR ACTION 241–45 (2009),
available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241563840_eng.pdf.
147 See generally Lode Vereeck & Klara Vrolix, The Social Willingness to Comply with the Law: The
Effect of Social Attitudes on Traffic Fatalities, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 385 (2007) (finding a significant
correlation between pedestrian deaths and the degree to which people follow traffic rules).
148 In robustness tests, we also construct a different URBAN index, using a weighted average (instead of a
simple average) for both the data from the Gallup database and the WHO database, with weights summing up
to one for similar variables. That is, if two variables are similar—e.g. “quality of roads” and “quality of roads
and highways”—we weight them only one-half. We find that our results are not affected by this choice.
149 Corruption Perceptions Index: Overview, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/
research/cpi/overview (last visited Sept. 2, 2014). Transparency International is a nongovernmental, worldwide
organization established for the fight against corruption. See Who We Are, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.
transparency.org/whoweare/organisation (last visited Sept. 2, 2014).
150 Corruption Perceptions Index: Overview, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 149.
151 Id.
152 See Julio Ríos-Figueroa & Jeffrey K. Staton, Unpacking the Rule of Law: A Review of Judicial
Independence Measures 2 (Apr. 26, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:/ssrn.com/abstract=
1434234.
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regulatory enforcement.153 Scholars, however, have expressed repeated
concerns with the validity of multicomponent measures.154 In large part, that
disagreement is a reflection of the disagreement over the meaning of the rule of
law that plagues theoretical research.155 Indeed, “[w]ithout a shared concept, it
is not clear how to compare validity across measures.”156 To address these
concerns, a possible solution is to avoid employing broad definitions and
focus, instead, on stand-alone components, as this mitigates issues of
correlation and trade-offs that affect multicomponent measures.157 Employing
measurement decisions that follow from a chosen theoretical framework and
defined analytical goals should also help to produce better estimates of the rule
of law.158
The choice of the CPI as proxy for the strength of the rule of law fits both
these suggested criteria. First, it captures a stand-alone, and important,
component of the rule of law: the absence of perceived corruption, as
corruption is a direct manifestation of the extent to which both government
officials and fellow citizens renege on their obligations under the social
contract.159 Moreover, because of its nonideological nature, the CPI seems
particularly well suited to avoid issues related to partisan debates over the
meaning of the rule of law (e.g., whether the rule of law includes economic
values, such as freedom of contract, or constitutional values, such as freedom
of expression).160 While divergent approaches may define “rule of law”

153 See, e.g., MARK DAVID AGRAST ET AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2012–
2013 11 (2012), available at http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Index_Report_2012.pdf
(providing data on several dimensions of the rule of law, such as limited government powers, absence of
corruption, order and security, fundamental rights, open government, regulatory enforcement, civil justice,
criminal justice, and informal justice). The World Justice Project (WJP) is among the most well-known
indexes of the rule of law. However, as explained in the text, using indexes based on multiple variables can be
problematic. Additionally, the WJP database only covers 97 countries, while the Transparency International
database provides data on 177 countries.
154 See Ríos-Figueroa & Staton, supra note 152, at 2.
155 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
156 Ríos-Figueroa & Staton, supra note 152, at 3.
157 Id. at 5 (focusing on judicial independence); see also Rodriguez et al., supra note 31, at 1474
(suggesting that several of the rule of law’s components often are in conflict with one another, raising trade-off
issues in estimating the rule of law “more globally” that are difficult to solve).
158 Robert Adcock & David Collier, Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and
Quantitative Research, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 529, 539 (2001).
159 See Absence of Corruption, THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org/factors/
absence-of-corruption (last visited Sept. 2, 2014); see also Daniel Treisman, The Causes of Corruption: A
Cross-National Study, 76 J. PUB. ECON. 399, 399 (2000) (finding that countries with longer exposure to
democracy exhibit lower level of corruption).
160 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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differently, there can be no question that a lack of public corruption is a core
goal of a rule of law society. Where public officials may exercise their power
on a whim—or in exchange for money—a country is not governed by laws, but
rather by men.161 Second, under this Article’s theoretical framework, the rule
of law embodies a requirement of conditional reciprocity according to which
individuals follow the rules as long as they assume that others follow the rules
as well. Because the CPI captures perceived corruption, it thus measures
precisely what we want to know: how individuals in a given country perceive
the degree of commitment by others around them to legality.
Our regression analysis of the impact of urban infrastructure quality
(URBAN) on the strength of the rule of law (as proxied by the CPI) also includes
controls for a number of relevant variables, such as GDP per capita (GDP),
INCOMEEQUALITY, HUMANRIGHTS, HEALTHCARE, and EDUCATION (all defined
in Appendix Table 2).
Controlling for a country’s GDP per capita is particularly important, as a
vast body of literature suggests a relationship between corruption and GDP.
Drawing on recent studies suggesting that a higher GDP might reduce
corruption (rather than the other way around, as conventionally assumed),162
we control for GDP per capita163 so to exclude the possibility that any
identified relationship between URBAN and the CPI might be driven by a
country’s GDP.

161

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
The existing literature on the relationship between GDP and corruption recognizes the difficulty of
deriving clear arguments with respect to the direction of causation between these two variables. See, e.g.,
Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Corruption in Empirical Research: A Review 2–3 (Nov. 1999), (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/d2ws1_jglambsdorff.pdf.
Nonetheless, most empirical studies assume a direction of causality that goes from (higher/lower) corruption to
(lower/higher) GDP. See Hafeez Ur Rehman & Amjad Naveed, Determinants of Corruption and Its Relation
to GDP: (A Panel Study), 12 J. POL. STUD. 27, 30–32 (2007). Only recently, scholars have begun to explore
the possibility of “reverse causality,” with the direction of causality going from (higher/lower) GDP to
(lower/higher) corruption. See, e.g., Daniel Treisman, What We Have Learned about the Causes of Corruption
from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 211, 211 (2007).
163 We retrieved GDP estimates from the World Bank GDP per capita dataset. See GDP Per Capita in
Current U.S. Dollars, WORLDBANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries?
display=default (last visited Sept. 2, 2014) (defining GDP per capita as “gross domestic product [in current
U.S. dollars] divided by midyear population”).
162
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We also include a control for INCOMEEQUALITY164 and HUMANRIGHTS,165 in
order to verify whether the impact of URBAN on the CPI still persists once we
take into account the impact of these other variables.
Further, we recognize that broader definitions of urban infrastructure tend
to include both the quality of a country’s health care system and education as
major components.166 However, both health care and education are
multidimensional concepts, meaning that they do not only include an “urban
dimension” (i.e., whether a country has a sufficient number of well-maintained
hospital and schools) but also an “intrinsic quality dimension” (i.e., health or
educational services might be excellent notwithstanding poor hospital or
school infrastructure). As discussed above, multidimensional concepts are
more difficult to measure.167 For this reason, we limit our definition of URBAN
to single-dimensional concepts (i.e., a country’s “basic” urban infrastructure
such as, for example, roads and highways), while controlling that the impact of
URBAN on the CPI still persists once HEALTHCARE and EDUCATION are taken
into account as additional independent variables.168
We show our overall sample of 124 countries in Appendix Table 1, ranked
by their scores on the URBAN index.169 We also note that we perform almost all
of our regressions with contemporaneous data from 2011. In the few cases
where observations were unavailable for 2011, we use the last available data.
B. Cross-Country Analysis
Figure 2 visually illustrates the correlation between the quality of urban
infrastructure (URBAN) and the robustness of the rule of law, as measured by
the CPI.

164

We retrieved estimates of INCOMEINEQUALITY from the World Bank GINI index dataset. See GINI
Index, WORLDBANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI (last visited Sept. 2, 2014).
165 We retrieved estimates of HUMANRIGHTS from the Escola de Cultura de Pau Human Right Index 2010
dataset. See Maria Cañadas Francesch et al., Alert 2010! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and
Peacebuilding, ESCOLA DE CULTURA DE PAU, 185–94 (Dec. 31, 2009), http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/
programas/alerta/alerta/alerta10i.pdf. Among available human rights indexes, the Escola de Pau index is the
more comprehensive, and is comprised of 22 indicators. See id. at 185. Higher scores on the index indicate a
larger degree of noncompliance with human rights obligations. See id.
166 See supra note 17.
167 See supra notes 153–57 and accompanying text.
168 In other words, we verify that URBAN has an impact on the rule of law (i.e., the CPI) that is
independent from the effect of both HEALTHCARE and EDUCATION.
169 In Appendix Table 1, we also provide the abbreviation for each country (i.e., Tick) included in our
sample. We show summary statistics for each of the variables employed in our analysis in Appendix Table 3.
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Figure 2. Correlation between Rule of Law (CPI) and URBAN
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Figure 2 shows a clear positively sloped relation between URBAN and the
with a positive and significant correlation between the two variables at
0.78. This evidence suggests that lower-quality urban infrastructure
(corresponding to a lower score on URBAN) is associated to a weaker rule of
law (corresponding to higher perceived corruption and, hence, a lower score on
the CPI).170 This is consistent with our claim that citizens will cooperate with
the government and among themselves—therefore refraining from the conflict
patterns inherent to corrupt practices (e.g., bribery, extortion, fund
misappropriation, and the like)—as long as the quality of urban infrastructure
signals that cooperation is mutually profitable to the social contractors.
CPI,

We show the results of our linear (OLS) regressions of the CPI (our
dependent variable) against URBAN (our main independent variable) in Table 1.
Specifically, in Column (1) we present the univariate regression (i.e., the
uncontrolled regression of the CPI against URBAN); in Columns (2) through (6),
we control for GDP, HEALTHCARE, EDUCATION, INCOMEEQUALITY, and
HUMANRIGHTS; and in Column (7) we control for all variables. We observe
170 The sample distribution in Figure 2 also seems to point to the existence of a threshold effect—that is,
the slope of the reduced form correlation between URBAN and the CPI suggests that urban infrastructure must
reach a certain level before corruption begins to decline significantly. Correspondingly, when URBAN is
relatively low (below 55), the CPI is more stationary, suggesting that a certain level of urban infrastructure may
be a necessary precondition for the emergence and maintenance of a robust rule of law.
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that including a control for all variables reduces our sample to 101
observations.
Table 1. OLS Estimates
Variables
URBAN

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

CPI

CPI

CPI

CPI

CPI

CPI

CPI

0.159***
(0.0115)

0.0865***
(0.0204)

0.155***
(0.0208)

0.106***
(0.0122)

0.154***
(0.0124)

0.141***
(0.0120)

0.0614***
(0.0171)

GDP

0.0373*
(0.0208)
0.00301
(0.0120)

HEALTHCARE

0.0766***
(0.0220)

-0.0139
(0.00923)
1.052***
(0.134)

EDUCATION

0.919***
(0.146)
-0.0238
(0.0167)

INCOMEEQUALITY

HUMANRIGHTS

0.0114
(0.0114)
-0.221***
(0.0600)

-0.220***
(0.0520)

CONSTANT

-5.495***
(0.700)

-2.032*
(1.032)

-5.416***
(0.806)

-6.178***
(0.543)

-4.273***
(1.102)

-3.918***
(0.777)

-3.616***
(1.083)

OBSERVATIONS
R-SQUARED

124
0.619

124
0.732

124
0.619

124
0.743

110
0.626

114
0.663

101
0.837

As shown by Table 1,171 URBAN has a positive and statistically significant
impact on the CPI in all our regressions—which is, again, consistent with our
claim that urban infrastructure plays a crucial role in underpinning the rule of
law. Table 1 further shows that the impact of URBAN on the CPI remains
significant when we control for HEALTHCARE and EDUCATION (in Columns (3)
and (4)), suggesting that the impact of a country’s basic urban infrastructure on
the strength of the rule law is an autonomous explanatory variable.
C. Addressing Endogeneity
One potential concern with the above methodology is that OLS analysis
only tells us whether the variables discussed are correlated, rather than one
causes the next. Hence, that analysis cannot exclude endogeneity, i.e., the
171 In all our Tables, (i) the variables CPI, URBAN and GDP are standardized: from each observation we
subtract the relevant average and we divide the resulting number for the standard deviation; (ii) we use
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, and (iii) the ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively. This means that the null hypothesis (the hypothesis that an independent variable has
no impact on a dependent variable) cannot be rejected with a probability of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. In
statistics, when the significance level is above 10%, it is standard to consider the result to be statistically
insignificant or uninformative.
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possibility that (i) changes in the rule of law (CPI) correlate with the quality of
the urban environment (URBAN), but may be caused by a country characteristic
other than URBAN (a “specification problem”), or that (ii) changes in the CPI
may cause changes in URBAN rather than the other way around (a “simultaneity
problem”).172 If either is true, the regression model we employ and the
estimates we obtain may not be robust.
While addressing potential endogeneity concerns is a major challenge for
any empirical study, it is especially so in the absence of panel data, as in our
study.173 Because of this limitation, our analysis is constrained to the
cross-country dimension of the relationship between urban infrastructure and
the rule of law. This limitation does not allow us to consider individual country
characteristics (country fixed effects), potentially increasing the risk of both
specification and simultaneity problems.174
To address the above endogeneity concerns, we employ an instrumental
variable approach through a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression.175 The
first stage predicts the key independent variable using an instrumental variable
(or exogenous regressor)—a variable that can explain changes in the
independent variable but is unrelated (or poorly related) to the dependent
variable being studied. The second stage explains the dependent variable
through the independent variable as predicted using the instrumental variable.

172 See Lubimor P. Litov, et al., Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer-Directors in Public Corporations, 102 GEO.
L.J. 413, 436 (2014); see also Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime”
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1255–56 (2003). In the econometric jargon, specification and simultaneity
problems are respectively referred to as “omitted and correlated variable bias” and “reverse causality.” See
WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 56–58 (7th ed. 2012).
173 Panel data is unavailable for two reasons. First, most of the data from the Gallup dataset about URBAN
is only available for 2011. Second, the CPI is not designed to allow for country scores to be compared over
time. The CPI reports a country’s rank relative to other countries rather than a country’s score relative to itself
over time. Hence, the CPI delivers only relative information—and the CPI ranking is a one off assessment.
Given the relative measure of the CPI, a country’s rank in a given data source can change (i) if perceptions of
corruption in other countries included in that source change, or (ii) if countries are added or removed from that
data source.
174 With panel data, we could investigate the time series evidence (with both country fixed effects and
first-difference regressions) of the relationship between URBAN and the CPI, mitigating potential biases from
omitted time-invariant variables as well as reverse causality issues at the country level. For a discussion of
fixed-effects and first-difference methods as applied to legal analysis, see Litov et al., supra note 172, at 437–
38.
175 See generally JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL
DATA 89–90 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing 2SLS regressions and the diagnostic tests used to determine whether
instrumental variables are correctly selected). For a discussion of the instrumental variable approach as applied
to legal analysis, see Litov et al., supra note 172, at 436–37.
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As instrumental variable that we assume would influence a country’s urban
infrastructure quality (URBAN), but would not (or poorly) influence the strength
of that country’s rule of law (CPI), we selected the number of each country’s
World Heritage sites (UNESCO)176—collecting data from the United Nations
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization website.177 The presence of
World Heritage sites would intuitively appear to positively impact people’s
perception of a country’s urban environment as well as promote investment in
urban infrastructure to attract and manage site-related tourism.178 At the same
time, World Heritage sites are part of the historical heritage of a country179 and
thus largely unrelated to a country’s current commitment to the rule of law. In
this respect, Mexico, China, and Italy provide good examples. All of these
countries have remarkable World Heritage sites,180 while their corruption
levels are relatively high (i.e., their CPIs are relatively low).181
We document the results of our second-stage regressions of the CPI against
182
URBAN, as predicted through UNESCO, in Table 2.
Specifically, in Column
(1) we present the univariate regression; in Columns (2) through (6), we
control for GDP, HEALTHCARE, EDUCATION, INCOMEEQUALITY, and
HUMANRIGHTS; and in Column (7) we control for all variables. We observe

176 Like all other variables appearing in our analysis, we standardize UNESCO: from each observation we
subtracted the average of the variable, and then we divided the resulting number by the standard deviation of
that variable. Further, in our regressions we use the logarithmic transformation of UNESCO, because its
distribution is strongly positively skewed (left-skewed).
177 World Heritage List, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list (last visited Sept. 2, 2014). At the time
we preformed our analysis, UNESCO’s list included 962 sites (745 cultural, 188 natural, and 29 mixed sites)
in 157 countries. See id.
178 As reported on the UNESCO website, sites must be of outstanding universal value and meet selecting
criteria in order to be included on the World Heritage list. Criteria for Selection for World Heritage List,
UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria (last visited Sept. 2, 2014). At minimum, the presence of a World
Heritage Site should influence URBAN by increasing the score on the city beauty component of that index. See
supra note 145 and accompanying text. Some of these sites are transboundary properties, belonging to more
than a single country. For example, the “Waterton Glacier International Peace Park” is listed as being a
transboundary Canadian-American property. See Waterton Glacier Inernational Peace Park, UNESCO,
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/354 (last visited Sept. 2, 2014). In similar cases, we assign the site to each
country. Intuitively, a World Heritage site is a public, and thus, non-exclusive, good. Hence, even though a site
is shared between two (or more) countries, it may still have the same positive impact on the people’s
perception of the urban environment, as well as promote investments in urban infrastructure, in both countries
179 See UNESCO, OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD HERITAGE
CONVENTION 2–5 (2013), available at http:// whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide13-en.pdf.
180 See World Heritage List, UNESCO, supra note 177.
181 See Corruption Perceptions Index: Overview, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 149.
182 To save space, we show the results of our first-stage regressions on the impact of UNESCO on URBAN in
Appendix Table 4.
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that including a control for all variables reduces our sample to 101
observations.
Table 2. Second-Stage Regression
Variables
URBAN (IV)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

CPI

CPI

CPI

CPI

CPI

CPI

CPI

0.145***
(0.0428)

0.110*
(0.0633)

0.135**
(0.0641)

0.0975*
(0.0580)

0.121*
(0.0631)

0.195***
(0.0288)

0.178***
(0.0575)

0.0507
(0.0346)

GDP

0.0149
(0.0207)
0.0124
(0.0294)

HEALTHCARE

-0.0478**
(0.0187)
1.109***
(0.385)

EDUCATION

0.912***
(0.131)
-0.0361
(0.0222)

INCOMEEQUALITY

HUMANRIGHTS

CONSTANT
OBSERVATIONS
R-SQUARED

0.0216
(0.0144)
-0.122
(0.0837)

-0.188**
(0.0765)

-4.636*
(2.640)

-3.329
(3.385)

-4.719**
(2.303)

-5.891***
(2.181)

-1.725
(4.590)

-7.470***
(1.906)

-8.095***
(2.789)

124
0.614

124
0.725

124
0.615

124
0.742

110
0.603

114
0.600

101
0.771

As shown by Table 2, the coefficient of URBAN in all our regressions is
positive and statistically significant. This means that URBAN still has a positive
impact on the CPI when predicted through the exogenous regressor UNESCO. In
particular, the coefficient in Column (7), which includes all our controls, is
statistically significant at the 1% level.183 The fact that the impact of URBAN on
the CPI holds when controlling for HEALTHCARE and EDUCATION (in Columns
(3) and (4)) sustains that result, confirming that the influence “basic” urban
infrastructure exerts on individuals’ commitment to the rule of law is, to a
significant extent, independent from those variables. Overall, these results
confirm that our instrumental variable analysis properly addressed the
endogeneity concerns discussed above,184 suggesting (1) that the quality of
183 See supra note 171. In addition, the coefficient in Table 2, Column (7), at 0.178, is higher than the
corresponding coefficient we obtain in the OLS estimation, at 0.0766.
184 To test the validity of our instrumental variable approach, we performed the “Hansen-Sargan
endogeneity test” for Column (7) (i.e., the fully controlled model) of the 2SLS regression. The Hansen-Sargan
endogeneity test verifies whether the specified endogenous variable (i.e., URBAN) can be treated as exogenous
after instrumenting it through the excluded instrument UNESCO. This means that under the null hypothesis, the
instrumental variable (i.e., UNESCO) is treated as exogenous; a rejection of the null indicates that the
endogeneity problem has not been addressed and that no causality has been identified. In particular, the
Hansen-Sargan endogeneity test is defined as the difference of two Hansen-Sargan endogeneity test statistics:
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urban infrastructure has a measurable impact on the rule of law, (2) that a
higher quality urban infrastructure causes a country to have a strengthened rule
of law, and (3) that a weaker urban infrastructure leads to a weakened rule of
law.
III. NORMATIVE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The results of our empirical investigation supports our claim that the
quality of urban infrastructure shapes a polity’s commitment to the rule of law,
suggesting that urban decay is potentially as harmful to the rule of law as
ineffective legal institutions. To put it plainly, the overall decline of America’s
urban infrastructure—made dramatically evident by the blight and decay of
Detroit and several other American cities185—jeopardizes an assumed pillar of
American society: the shared commitment to the rule of law.
In this Part, we investigate the causes behind the nation’s collapsing urban
infrastructure and propose interventions that can halt the vicious cycle that
begins with urban decay. Our analysis suggests that urban decay is an
unintended effect of long-standing austerity policies at both the national and
subnational levels vis-à-vis local municipalities. Such policies, operationalized
at the state level through the “fiscal constitutions,”186 are commonly justified
as necessary to force communities to maintain fiscal discipline.187 What this
argument overlooks, however, are the effects of austerity on the urban
environment and the societal commitment to the rule of law. That is, it neglects
the trade-off between the ex ante gains of austerity and the ex post social costs
associated with the loss of social enforcement (social cooperation and social
advocacy) and a broken rule of law.
Putting forward a detailed blueprint for optimally solving this trade-off is
beyond the scope of this Article. What follows, instead, is a roadmap for
subsequent discussions of the costs and consequences of austerity at the local

the first treats the instrumental variable (i.e., UNESCO) as endogenous and the second as exogenous. Thus, the
lower is the value of the Hansen-Sargan endogeneity test, the higher the probability that the instrumental
variable (UNESCO) is exogenous. For a theoretical discussion of the Sargan-Hansen endogeneity test, see
FUMIO HAYASHI, ECONOMETRICS 217–21 (2000). For a more practical discussion, see Christopher F. Baum et
al., Instrumental Variables and GMM: Estimation and Testing, 3 STATA J. 1, 17–18 (2003). The associated
p-value of the test for model (7) is 0.15, implying that we cannot reject the null hypothesis and, hence, that the
variable URBAN, as predicted through UNESCO, can be treated as exogenous.
185 See supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text.
186 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
187 See infra notes 200–07 and accompanying text.
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level. With this objective in mind, we suggest that selective centralized support
of local services would help preserve a shared commitment to the rule of law,
without disrupting a municipality’s incentives for financial accountability—
with a net gain to social welfare.
A. Austerity and the Rule of Law
Our analysis of the relationship between urban infrastructure and the rule of
law has so far proceeded on the assumption that citizens delegate authority to,
and demand accountability from, “the government,” conceived as a central
entity. In actuality, however, authority and accountability for overseeing both a
country’s enforcement function and the provision of public goods are unlikely
to be administered exclusively by central authorities.188 Instead, they are
typically shared between central and local bodies according to principle of
decentralization and fiscal federalism.189 In fact, in the United States, local
municipalities are the primary providers of important public services, including
urban infrastructure.190
Decentralization in the provision of public goods primarily addresses
organizational and informational needs, theoretically promoting the more
efficient delivery of such goods.191 At the same time, however, decentralization
poses a problem of moral hazard, as local municipalities may have incentives
to overspend if they anticipate that the central government will back municipal
financial obligations in case of distress.192 In response to this problem, the U.S.
federal government and state governments have embraced a general
commitment to austerity vis-à-vis local municipalities, through a variety of
policies that combine balanced budget requirements, expenditure limitations,

188

See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1120, 1120 (1999)
(discussing how authority has been given various states “significant portions of federal authority”).
189 Fiscal federalism is the branch of economics that studies issue of decentralized authority that arise in
the context of a federal system of government or, more generally, in systems of government that involve
decentralized government policy-making within a formally unitary state. See Geoffrey Brennan & Alan
Hamlin, Fiscal Federalism, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 144, 148
(Peter Newman ed., 1998).
190 See Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV.
633, 634 (2008). “National” public goods (e.g., national defense) that serve the entire population of a country
remain the domain of the central government. See Oates, supra note 188, at 1121; Super, supra note 27, at
2577 (“[T]he federal government leverages its fiscal resources for particular types of activity that it believes
are national priorities.”).
191 See Oates, supra note 188, at 1120.
192 See infra notes 200–02 and accompanying text.
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and other fiscal constraints.193 This approach has been widely criticized on the
ground that it downplays the importance of the economic cycle in causing local
decline.194 As we explain below, however, lost in the discussion on austerity
policies is the consideration of the declining urban environment these policies
bring about and the effects that such an environment may produce on social
contracting and the rule of law.
1. Decentralization and Moral Hazard
Under social contract theory, citizens delegate authority to the government
in exchange for the delivery of public goods.195 In practice, however, the
execution of that obligation is (in part) decentralized to local municipalities.
This serves to address two main informational and organizational issues in the
administration of the government’s functions. First, when a country’s
development results in geographically distinct sectors, decentralizing the
provision of public goods ensures that those goods reflect local needs better
than a centralized one-size-fits-all solution.196 Second, while the exclusive
provision of public goods by the central government produces a monopoly
regime, a decentralized system enables competition among local
municipalities.197 Under such a system, citizens can theoretically “shop” for a
193

See infra notes 203–07 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 208–11 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
196 This is the classic “Oates’ decentralization theorem,” introduced by economist William Oates. Under
Oates’ theorem, local governments are assumed to have informational advantages over the central government
in tailoring public goods policy to territorial needs. This promotes the production of the optimal level of output
of local public goods, maximizing social welfare. See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 54 (1972); see
also Brennan & Hamlin, supra note 189, at 145; Oates, supra note 188, at 1121–22.
197 The theory of competitive federalism has its roots in the work of economist Charles Tiebout. See
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418, 422 (1956). The central
argument of Tiebout’s theory was that just as market competition produces a system that is responsive to
consumers’ needs, interjurisdictional competition results in a government system that is responsive to the
preferences of local residents. See id. at 420. Tiebout’s theory, however, is not without its critics. First,
competitive federalism has been criticized as being based upon unrealistic assumptions. See, e.g., DAVID N.
KING, FISCAL TIERS: THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNMENT 28–32 (1984) (providing a summary of
this line of criticism). In particular, criticism has been raised about the level of information potential residents
have about new municipalities and the assumption of their unconstrained ability to move. See, e.g., KING,
supra, at 29–30. Second, some have argued that interjurisdictional competition does not result in an
equilibrium. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Charles J. Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility, in
EXPLORATIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 246, 246–47 (James M. Buchanan ed., 1989); Joseph E.
Stiglitz, The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-Five Years After Tiebout: A Perspective, in LOCAL
PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: THE TIEBOUT MODEL AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 17, 50 (George R.
Zodrow ed., 1983). Third, it has been observed that Tiebout’s model is incomplete as it only considers exit as
an organizational mean, while citizens can also exercise voice to influence the production of public goods. See,
194
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specific bundle of public goods and tax burdens by choosing where to
locate.198 The threat of citizens’ relocation in turn incentivizes the efficient
production of collective services.199 Thus, in principle, the decentralization of
the government’s obligations as provider of public goods to local
municipalities should serve the goal of promoting the efficient execution of
those obligations—supporting a robust rule of law.
Decentralization, however, poses a problem of moral hazard and fiscal
discipline, as congruence is required between a municipality’s revenues and
expenditures to obtain the beneficial effects of decentralization.200 If the central
government bears the risk of local overspending or other forms of
opportunism—assuming full responsibility for a municipality’s financial
obligations—the incentives for social enforcement are reduced, because
residents only partially internalize the consequences of their inadequate
monitoring of local officials. Central government “insurance” allows distressed
municipalities to externalize the costs or subsidy of public goods and services
onto citizens of other areas. Hence, residents of distressed municipalities have
lower incentives to monitor local officials, “since there would be little reason
for [them] to monitor the use of funds that they did not provide” (or provided
only marginally).201 In rationally expecting citizens to be civically disengaged,
e.g., John D. Donahue, Tiebout or not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America’s Devolution Debate, J.
ECON. PERSP., Fall 1997, at 73, 74, 80; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the Political
Economy of Local Government, in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: THE TIEBOUT MODEL AFTER
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, supra, at 55, 73–74; see also infra notes 219–22 and accompanying text (discussing the
use of exit and voice in Hirschman’s classic taxonomy of organizational means). Despite this criticism,
Tiebout’s central argument—that municipalities compete for residents—continues to enjoy wide acceptance.
See, e.g., John E. Chubb, The Political Economy of Federalism, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 994, 995 (1985); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 28–29, 33–35, 43–44 (1983);
Oates, supra note 188, at 1124.
198 See Tiebout, supra note 197, at 418 (specifying the conditions under which the potential benefits of
competitive federalism would be realized).
199 See id. at 419–20.
200 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 287 (2012) (“As a general proposition, fiscal federalism requires each
level of government to internalize both the costs and the benefits of its activities.”); Wallace E. Oates, Toward
a Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism, 12 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 349, 350–54 (2005) (suggesting
that financial independence is necessary to avoid that central governments might compromise the satisfaction
of local needs); Super, supra note 27, at 2571 (describing the division of fiscal responsibilities as traditional of
fiscal federalism).
201 Gillette, supra note 200, at 299; see also Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Institutions for
Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline, 12 CONST. POL. ECON. 141, 142–44 (2001) (observing that when residents
do not fully internalize the cost of the local public goods, they have an incentive to overconsume). The
cross-subsidization of distressed municipalities could also induce residents of financially healthier
municipalities to produce suboptimally, as these residents anticipate that they will not fully enjoy the product
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local officials in turn have no incentives to avoid profligate spending or other
misconduct.202
Austerity, operationalized at state level through the “fiscal constitutions,”203
has been traditionally justified as the appropriate response to issues of
municipal moral hazard. Central governments have embraced a general
commitment to avoid subsidies to local municipalities through policies that
variously combine balanced budget requirements, expenditure limitations, and
other fiscal constraints.204 Historically, these policies emerged as a response to
the cascade of municipal failure in the second half of the nineteenth century
and the perception that overspending by local officials caused those failures.205
The legacy of that political response has endured with a continuing belief that a
current commitment to austerity prevents the need for future spending to
support troubled municipalities and, hence, is necessary to constrain moral
hazard at the local level.
It is thus unsurprising that much of the political discourse that has followed
Detroit’s filing for bankruptcy has focused on ensuring that no pathway for
either a federal or state bailout of Detroit will be available.206 Underlying this
of their efforts. See generally TIROLE, supra note 53, at 237, 242–43 (discussing cross-subsidization as “good
borrowers being forced, by the suspicion of low-quality borrowing, to issue high-interest debt or to
substantially reduce their equity stake” and discussing how asymmetric information reduce the quality of
loans).
202 See, e.g., Robert J. Barro, The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, PUB. CHOICE, Spring 1973,
at 19, 22–26 (arguing that without electoral controls to constrain their behavior, politicians have strong
incentives to further their own self-interest at the expense of the public interest); Kevin A. Kordana, Tax
Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1066–71 (1997) (describing the moral hazard
problem inherent in municipal borrowing).
203 See Super, supra note 27, at 2549 n.21 (defining “fiscal constitution”).
204 See Schragger, supra note 27, at 866 (observing that states have adopted various constitutional
constraints to limit fiscal flexibility, including balanced budget requirements—in forty-one states, earmarking
the use of public monies—in forty-six states, and limits on debt—three-quarters of the states). In addition,
many states have “tax uniformity requirements intended to prevent subsidies through selective exemptions.”
Id. And over thirty states have some form of expenditure limitations. See id.
205 See id. at 862–63; Super, supra note 27, at 2605–07. Super observes that the input for budget
constraints at the state and local levels originally came from Jacksonians, who viewed such constraints as a
way to limit “the ability of corrupt or imprudent state government to inflict lasting harm.” See Super, supra
note 27, at 2606.
206 See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, $300 Million in Detroit Aid, but No Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2013, at
A1 (reporting declarations by administrator officials in Washington about the “somewhere between zero and
zero” chances that Congress may bailout Detroit); Kevin Liptak, No Bailout Coming for Detroit, Treasury
Secretary Says, CNN POLITICAL TICKER (July 28, 2013, 12:36 PM ET), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/
2013/07/28/no-bailout-coming-for-detroit-treasury-secretary-says/ (reporting U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack
Lew’s comment that “the issues that Detroit has in terms of problems with its creditors it’s going to have to
work out with its creditors”).
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discourse is the usual tale of local excess, and responsibility for its
consequences, that has commanded austerity responses to local downturns in
the United States for more than a century.207 However, this is not the full
picture.
2. Failing Cities, Norm Contagion, and the End of the Rule of Law
Central governments’ austerity policies vis-à-vis municipalities are an
ex ante response to management and monitoring failures at the local level. The
assumption is that meaningful fiscal discipline can provide the right incentives
to avoid those failures in the future. Echoing classic Keynesian arguments
against austerity,208 the main criticism to this approach has been that it fails to
consider the causal relationship between economic cycles and local decline.
Under this criticism, local decline is attributed to the natural alternation
between periods of booming prosperity and subsequent depression, rather than
moral hazard occurring at the local level.209 Those who believe that local
downturns depend on the business cycle question, “whether the goal of ‘fiscal

207 The federal bailouts of New York City in 1975 and Washington, D.C. in 1995 are two isolated
exceptions. See Gillette, supra note 200, at 308.
208 Economist John Maynard Keynes introduced the notion that economies naturally cycle between booms
and busts and demonstrated that austerity policies tend to exacerbate these swings. See JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, Notes on the Trade Cycle, in THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 313
(MacMillan Press Ltd. 1973) (1936). Keynesians attack austerity on the ground that cutting public
expenditures leads to reduced employment and aggregate consumption and, ultimately, decreasing growth. For
Keynesian accounts of the recent wave of austerity, see, for example, Isabel Ortiz & Matthew Cummins, The
Age of Austerity: A Review of Public Expenditures and Adjustment Measures in 181 Countries i (Mar. 24,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://policydialogue.org/publications/working_papers/age_of_
austerity/ (“The worldwide propensity toward fiscal consolidation can be expected to aggravate the
employment crisis and diminish public support at a time when it is most needed.”); JAN IN ‘T VELD, EUROPEAN
COMM’N, ECONOMIC PAPER NO. 506, FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND SPILLOVER IN THE EURO AREA PERIPHERY
AND CORE 1 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2013/pdf/ecp506_en.
pdf (reporting that recent consolidation measures in the Euro zone have had large negative spillover effects,
through the channels of both reduced demand and competiveness, and overall worsened the economic
situation). In the United States, economist Paul Krugman has notably attacked austerity policies with great
frequency from the pages of the New York Times. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The 1 Percent’s Solution,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2013, at A31 (arguing that the austerians’ position has imploded); Paul Krugman, The
Depressed Economy is All About Austerity, N.Y. TIMES BLOG: THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Sept. 24, 2013,
11:48 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/the-depressed-economy-is-all-about-austerity/
(arguing that the U.S. depressed economy can be largely blamed on government spending cuts).
209 See, e.g., TERRY NICHOLS CLARK & LORNA CROWLEY FERGUSON, CITY MONEY: POLITICAL
PROCESSES, FISCAL STRAIN, AND RETRENCHMENT 85–91 (1983) (documenting that local economies are
influenced by trends in national economies); Natalie R. Cohen, Municipal Default Patterns: An Historical
Study, 9 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 55, 55 (1989) (arguing that municipal defaults are closely related to a
country’s business cycle).
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discipline’ is itself achievable,”210 and attack austerity on the ground that it
produces procyclical policies that exacerbate, rather than cure, the negative
effects of economic swings.211
The problem with the austerity myth, however, lies not only in its disregard
for the natural booms and busts of economic cycles. Lost in much of the
discussion on austerity is the consideration of the ex post effect of such policies
on social contracting and the rule of law. By definition, austerity involves deep
cuts to essential public services that are likely to be conducive to a lower
quality, and potentially decaying, urban environment. Limited resources for
garbage collection, fire protection, street maintenance, park upkeep, public
transportation, and the like tend to translate into abandoned trash piles, rutted
streets, unsafe parks, empty buildings, shattered streetlights and other
distinguishing features of urban decay.212 Decaying American cities—from
Detroit to Baltimore to Gary to San Bernardino and many more—offer vivid
examples of the implication of austerity.213 To make things worse, mandated
balanced budget constraints often require tax increases in already troubled
municipalities. Tellingly, Detroit has both the highest income and property tax
rates in the entire state of Michigan.214 Similarly, Baltimore has the highest
property taxes in Maryland, and its income tax is the highest allowed under
state law.215
This combination of declining urban infrastructure and onerous fiscal
burdens epitomizes the government’s abandonment of its obligations under the
public goods contracts, spurring a vicious cycle that jeopardizes the shared
commitment to the rule of law. As explained in Part I, this vicious cycle begins
with urban decay and ends with the loss of social enforcement of the rule of
law—increasing defections from the patterns of social cooperation and
advocacy that are necessary to establish and maintain a robust rule of law.216 It
is thus hardly surprising that popular press coverage of troubled cities has often
involved tales of increasing lawlessness, mounting corruption, and various
210

Schragger, supra note 27, at 863.
See David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CAL.
L. REV. 749, 766–69 (2010); Super, supra note 27, at 2609.
212 See Anderson, supra note 8, at 1160–67 (providing tangible, and recent, examples of the negative
effects cutting policies have produced on the quality of public services in many U.S. cities).
213 See supra notes 3–8.
214 See CITIZENS RES. COUNCIL OF MICH., REPORT NO. 382, DETROIT CITY GOVERNMENT REVENUES vi
(2013), http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/2013/rpt382.pdf.
215 See Munnell et al., supra note 6, at 2.
216 See supra Part I.A.3.
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other forms of social disorder217—as these are all manifestations of the
replacement of social cooperation with conflict patterns, both among citizens
and vis-à-vis authorities.
An accelerating rate of population decline in distressed municipalities is
similarly unsurprising.218 Under Albert Hirschman’s classic taxonomy of the
relationships between individuals and organizations,219 individuals essentially
have two organizational means to address a decrease in the quality of the goods
or services provided by an organization (including a municipality): “voice” and
“exit.” Voice involves the exercise of monitoring and governance rights—thus,
in the context of the government–citizens relationship, voice can be equated to
what we have defined as social advocacy.220 Exit involves the withdrawal of an
individual’s participation from an organization—for example, through
relocation to a new municipality. This analytical framework suggests that when
social advocacy is an unviable alternative, exit remains the only option to
escape unlivable urban environments and express one’s discontent with the
exercise of power by local and central authorities. Of course, the availability of

217 In March 2013, former Detroit’s mayor Kwame Kilpatrick was found guilty of multiple counts of
racketeering and extortion and sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison. See Steven Yaccino, Ex-Mayor
Sentenced to 28 Years in Corruption Case that Helped Detroit Go Broke, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2013, at A12.
Kilpatrick’s involvement in corruption was not an isolated case, but the symptom of a wider malaise. See, e.g.,
Kate Abbey-Lambertz, Detroit Corruption Rooted Out as Felony Bribery Charges Filed Against 7 Building
Inspectors, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2013, 12:40 PM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/29/
detroit-corruption_n_3837180.html. In fact, right before filing for bankruptcy, Detroit had higher crime rates
than other comparable U.S. jurisdictions and the highest violent crime rate among U.S. cities with over
200,000 residents. See City of Detroit, Proposal for Creditors (June 14, 2013), http://www.detroitmi.gov/
Portals/0/docs/EM/Reports/City%20of%20Detroit%20Proposal%20for%20Creditors1.pdf.
Similarly,
Baltimore has undergone repeated corruption scandals and so did most other troubled American
municipalities. See, e.g., Theo Emery, Baltimore Police Scandal Spotlights Leader’s Fight to Root out
Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2012, at A11; Ian Urbina, Baltimore Mayor is Convicted in One Count in Gift
Card Case, but Acquitted on 3, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, at A16; see also Anderson, supra note 8, at 1139,
1226–27 (finding that distressed cities that have cut public services have higher rates of violent crime, property
crime, and arson than national averages); Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeover of
Financially Failed Cities, 114 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 3), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407608 (“The deterioration of services during periods of
fiscal crisis translates into higher crime rates . . . .”).
218 See, e.g., Munnell et al., supra note 6, at 1–4 (“[Baltimore] has lost one-third of its population since
the 1950s . . . . [Detroit’s] population has plummeted more than 40 percent from its peak of nearly 1.2 million
when the local automobile industry was booming in the 1950s . . . . [and] Gary’s population has shrunk by
more than half since the 1960s . . . .”).
219 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 3–4 (1970).
220 See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
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exit will be limited for some residents.221 But empirical data on declining
population rates in distressed municipalities suggest that for at least some
individuals exit is both possible and attractive.222
Under the classic Tieboutian account of interjurisdictional mobility,223 a
citizen’s ability to exit a municipality that is failing to provide good services at
low cost produces a race to the top, which helps to sort “good” municipalities
from “bad.”224 We argue, however, that interjurisdictional mobility may have
additional, and overlooked, consequences. If one assumes the validity of this
Article’s approach to social contracting, citizens that relocate to escape urban
physical disorder may “export” conflict schemes. To the extent that urban
decay can be considered an effect of national and subnational austerity
policies, urban decay embodies a mass collective failure of the social contract.
Thus, the option of moving from one municipality to another is unlikely to
cure the rational expectation of legal failures and the devaluing of laws
engendered in citizens by urban decay. Having lived in one municipality that
has been ignored by the mass of people—as embodied by the state or federal
government—how can one have faith that the next municipality won’t suffer
the same fate?
Instead, exit has the potential to spread social discontent and the devaluing
of laws through norm contagion—particularly to the extent that individuals
move to urban environments that are similarly, though perhaps not yet quite as
severely, distressed. Relocating citizens that have developed adaptive
behavioral patterns involving routine law breaking as a response to hostile
urban environments are unlikely to immediately change their modus operandi
when transferring to a new municipality. For example, if dropping trash on the
221 The availability of exit is driven by the trade-off with the costs of exit, as resulting by the interaction
with a range of factors. Such costs include the costs arising from the fiscal characteristics of the new
municipality, but also “the location of the wage-earners’ workplaces, the availability of transportation, . . .
commuting costs (including time) and housing costs, and such factors as the location of relatives and friends.”
See Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 519 (1991).
222 A national survey conducted for the Department of Housing and Urban Development during the 1980s
found that 35.1% of the respondents said they would “definitely or probably” leave their community if public
services declined. See ELAINE B. SHARP, CITIZEN DEMAND-MAKING IN THE URBAN CONTEXT 149, 150–52
(1986); see also Note, Missed Opportunity: Urban Fiscal Crises and Financial Control Boards, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 733, 742–43 (1997) (“[R]eductions in general services such as playgrounds, fire and police protection,
and public transportation can often make a city unattractive to those who can choose where they live and,
furthermore, may have a disproportionate impact on certain groups of city residents.”).
223 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
224 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (2009); Schragger,
supra note 27, at 868.
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ground because there are no sufficient trashcans has become an acceptable
behavior,225 citizens will tend to replicate it when relocating to a new
municipality.
Of course, the impact of norm contagion on the social contracting
equilibrium of the new municipality will depend on multiple factors. However,
several arguments suggest that this impact might be non-negligible. For one
thing, empirical studies show that citizens tend to sort themselves into
income-homogenous communities, as a municipality’s fiscal characteristics are
a primary driver influencing the people’s decision to live there.226 This
suggests that relocation decisions from decaying municipalities involve
migration maps rather than random moves, meaning that critical masses of
individuals will tend to move from a decaying municipality to certain specific
new municipalities227—and, due to income constraints and the widespread
nature of urban decay in the United States, usually to new municipalities where
infrastructure is also likely to be of marginal quality. This adds to the impact of
norm contagion, as that impact critically depends on the magnitude of the
migration patterns from the decaying municipality to the new municipalities.
Additionally, the level of the new municipality’s urban infrastructure will play
a part in determining the impact of norm contagion. It is self-evident that the
better the quality of the new municipality’s infrastructure, the less likely the
relocating residents will be to stick with past habits of unlawful behavior.
However, once a citizen has developed those habits, the infrastructure quality
threshold that may be required to induce patterns of rule abidance may need to
be higher. If one considers the pervasiveness of urban decay in today’s
America and the structural failure to invest in urban infrastructure,228 it seems
unlikely that most municipalities will be able to meet that threshold.229
225

See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
See Been, supra note 221, at 525–26.
227 Id. at 524 (reporting empirical studies that show a correlation between differences in local tax and
expenditure policies and migration patterns).
228 See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
229 The data from the “Moving to Opportunity” (MTO) study conducted by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development are consistent with this theoretical assumption. Launched in 1994, the MTO
study involved the random assignment of housing vouchers to help low-income families move to less
disadvantaged and disorderly communities in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Baltimore, and Boston. See
Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 26, at 276–77, 300–14. In examining the results of the MTO study, Harcourt
and Ludwig find that “moving people to communities with less social or physical disorder—the key
intervening factor in the original Wilson and Kelling broken windows hypothesis—on balance does not lead to
a reduction in their criminal behavior.” See id. at 277. The MTO study is thus consistent with the idea that
merely moving people to “less disadvantaged and disorderly” communities might not be sufficient to restore
patterns of rule abidance over patterns of rule defection. Instead, once the contract between government and
226
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It is worth noting the parallel between our story of norm contagion and
classical economic contagion, which involves the possibility that local distress
may spread to other, economically interconnected, municipalities.230 Even
strict fiscal federalists concede that centralized intervention might occasionally
be necessary to avoid systemic effects231—much as it is necessary to bail out
banks whose failures would threaten the entire economy.232 Thus, the federal
rescue of New York City from impending bankruptcy in 1975233 can be
likened to the federal bailouts of financial giants such as Citigroup during the
recent financial crisis.234 Only in the presence of exceptional too-big-to-fail
concerns, however, will strict fiscal federalists concede that a centralized
bailout is necessary for a local municipality.235 In contrast to this reductive
approach, our analysis suggests that the risk of contagion following local
distress may involve multiple dimensions, with norm contagion being not as
citizens is broken, very high quality urban infrastructure is needed to control the ex post damages such a
breach may cause. This, however, may be politically or practically infeasible, which suggests that regulatory
measures to prevent the government from breaching that contract in the first place are needed. See infra Part
III.B.
230 See Gillette, supra note 200, at 302 (defining the risk of contagion inherent in municipal distress as
“the possibility that local distress is indicative of more general fiscal difficulties or that unresolved local
distress will cause disruption in other markets, because the risks of one are interconnected with risks
elsewhere”).
231 Under Oates’ Decentralization Theorem, the absence of spillover effects is a strong condition (or
constraint) necessary for decentralization to dominate centralization in the provision of public goods. See
Wallace E. Oates, On the Theory and Practice of Fiscal Decentralization 6, 12 (Inst. for Federalism &
Intergovernmental Relations, Working Paper No. 2006-05, 2006), available at http://www.ifigr.org/
publication/ifir_working_papers/IFIR-WP-2006-05.pdf; see also Paul Seabright, Accountability and
Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 61, 65, 85 (1996)
(concluding that centralization can increase welfare by improving “coordination” and accounting for spillover
effects, although it involves a loss of accountability).
232 See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 451–52, 483–84, 487 (2011)
(suggesting that for too-big-to-fail financial institutions—defined as those financial institutions “[where] there
is a perception that [the institution’s] failure might trigger socially unacceptable macroeconomic
consequences”—bailouts are inevitable); Simone M. Sepe, Regulating Risk and Governance in Banks: A
Contractarian Perspective, 62 EMORY L.J. 327, 381–83 (2012) (arguing that bank bailouts are unavoidable
given the risk of macroeconomic shocks that arise from bank failures).
233 See, e.g., Edward M. Gramlich, New York: Ripple or Tidal Wave? The New York City Fiscal Crisis:
What Happened and What Is to Be Done?, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 415, 423–26 (1976) (finding evidence of risk of
contagion in the potential failure of New York City). But see David S. Kidwell & Charles A. Trzcinka,
Municipal Bond Pricing and the New York City Fiscal Crisis, 37 J. FIN. 1239, 1246 (1982) (finding that the
effect of New York City’s near default on interest rates “was at most small and of short duration”).
234 Citigroup received $45 billion, funded through the U.S. government purchase of preferred stock with
warrants, plus other federal aid. See Bailout Recipients, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list
(last updated July 22, 2014).
235 See Gillette, supra note 200, at 308–09. However, one is left to question why the national significance
of a city like New York did justify centralized support, while Detroit does not. See supra note 206 and
accompanying text.
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strictly dependent on the size of the municipality as economic contagion and,
consequently, much less exceptional.
B. Saving our Cities
The above account of the relationship between austerity, declining urban
infrastructure, and commitment to the rule of law leaves us with a puzzle. On
the one hand, the central governments’ financial support of local municipalities
(i.e., full government insurance) leads to moral hazard, as incentives for social
enforcement are lost when the provision of purely local goods is
cross-subsidized by residents of other municipalities. On the other hand,
austerity policies still result in the loss of social enforcement—leading to
decaying urban environments and engendering a sense that following the rules
is no longer valuable.
The lack of social enforcement, in turn, is likely to call for stricter coercive
enforcement through increased policing.236 Distressed municipalities, however,
might be unable to afford the high costs of stricter coercive enforcement. The
empirical evidence confirms this assumption. According to recent data, nearly
every distressed U.S. city is also among the country’s “most underpoliced
cities.”237 And, in any event, as explained above, social and coercive
enforcement of the rule of law are only substitute to a limited, and imperfect,
extent.238
Economically, we can describe both full government insurance and
austerity policies as “corner solutions.” A corner solution exists where a
problem involving a trade-off between two (or more) variables is solved by
maximizing one variable at the expense of the other.239 Austerity policies
maximize ex ante efficiency (mitigating moral hazard), at the expense of
ex post efficiency (leading to urban decay). In contrast, full government
insurance maximizes ex post efficiency (minimizing urban decay), at the
expense of ex ante efficiency (increasing moral hazard). However, a polity
236

See supra notes 64–65, 113–21 and accompanying text.
Anderson, supra note 8, at 1161 (citing Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, The Effect of Police on
Crime: New Evidence from U.S. Cities, 1960-2010, at tbl.10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 18815, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18815). Anderson also reports that while heavily
underpoliced, “insolvent cities make sizable cuts to their law enforcement budgets during insolvency.” See id.
at 1162–63.
238 See supra notes 26, 120–21 and accompanying text.
239 See MICHAEL CARTER, FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 502 (2001) (defining a
boundary—i.e., corner—solution as the solution that “lies on the boundary of the feasible set” of solutions to
an optimization problem).
237
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needs both to constrain moral hazard and to avoid urban decay in order to
maintain a strong rule of law. Hence, individuals are not indifferent to
maximizing either variable over the other (i.e., ex ante versus ex post
efficiency). One should thus look for an “interior solution,”240 which can
ensure maximization of both variables.
1. Partial Insurance as an Interior Solution
At a theoretical level, partial government insurance—defined here as the
provision of partial financial support from the central governments to troubled
municipalities241—constitutes an immediate interior solution to the problem of
preserving a strong rule of law. On the one hand, partial government insurance
helps to maintain a municipality’s urban infrastructure in distressed times,
avoiding the ex post effects of austerity policies. On the other hand, since
partial insurance does not wholly shield residents from the cost of local
decline, it constrains the ex ante risk of increased moral hazard incentives.
Moving from a theoretical to a practical setting, providing a normative
justification for partial government insurance is a much more complex task. It
requires, for example, identifying the optimal insurance level that the central
government should provide242 and determining how best to address residual
incentives for increased moral hazard. Detailed answers to these and other
related questions are beyond this Article’s scope.243 However, we suggest as a
general guideline that centralized support to troubled municipalities should
operate selectively to ensure the uninterrupted operation of quality municipal
services and, in particular, a livable urban environment.244 The preservation of
240 See id. (defining an interior solution as “an interior point . . . of the feasible set” of solutions to an
optimization problem).
241 While, in principle, centralized support could equally come from the national government or
subnational governments, current political constraints suggest that the latter might be better placed to provide
partial government insurance. See Gillette, supra note 200, at 285 (suggesting that the states’ ability to
“exercise plenary authority over their political subdivisions” makes them better suited than the federal
government to create adequate mechanisms to address fiscal distress).
242 While Detroit received $300 million by the federal government, this amount of money does not qualify
as sufficient to preserve local public services when compared to the $18 billion budget deficit of Detroit. See
Calmes, supra note 206.
243 For an attempt to provide such detailed answers, see Anderson, supra note 8, at 1195–1221.
244 It is worth emphasizing the difference between our partial insurance approach and the municipal
insolvency law approach of preserving “basic health and safety” local services. See id. at 1188–94 (describing
the latter approach). The preservation of basic health and safety local services provided by municipal
bankruptcy law merely allows municipalities to derogate to the order of priority in payment, i.e., to postpone
the repayment of debt if this is needed to ensure the continuing provision of basic services. Anderson criticizes
existing municipal bankruptcy provisions to the extent that they fail to clearly define what amounts to a basic
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street lighting and a number of public parks, access to clean water and disposal
systems, and building maintenance (including the demolition of blighted
structures) are some examples of the services for which a central government
should provide insurance.
Support for similar interventions could be provided through the injection of
new money, temporary loan guarantees, or other forms of financial aid to local
municipalities. Importantly, unlike state or federal bailouts used to cover
existing budget deficits, selective intervention by the central governments
would not relieve the burden of financial distress entirely for local
municipalities. For example, it would not involve backing a city’s public
employee pension commitments, as this kind of shortfall is less likely to
immediately affect a polity’s urban environment quality.245 On the one hand,
this selective approach would mitigate the risk that expectations of future
rescue by the central governments would exacerbate moral hazard and increase
the likelihood of a municipality’s overspending.246 On the other hand, a policy
of selective intervention would avoid the drastic cuts to essential public
services that are likely to result in lower quality, and potentially decaying,
urban environments. This would produce two immediate benefits. First, it
would halt further urban decline and, hence, help to preserve at least some
level of social enforcement of the rule of law.247 Second, selective intervention
would make it more likely that a distressed municipality could avoid the
increased cost of coercive enforcement caused by increasing urban decline.
At the very least, central governments should preserve community viability
by backstopping urban decline caused by municipal financial distress, as this
would help preserve the public goods contract on which the rule of law
depends.248 This would not shield local residents from the financial strictures

health and safety service. See id. at 1194. However, even leaving aside Anderson’s claim, municipal
bankruptcy law does not touch on the issue of what should be done when a municipality’s cash flow income is
per se not sufficient to allow for the provision of public services (i.e., even under derogation to the order of
priority in payment).
245 An exception would be constituted by police and fire department employees, who provide essential
services to preserve a livable urban environment. Hence, it might be desirable to provide some partial
insurance for both these employees’ adequate staffing and sufficient coverage of their pension plans.
246 See supra notes 200–02 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text.
248 Anderson’s advocated aim of preserving what she calls “urban-scale habitability”—defined as
involving “a question of collective conditions, such as crime rates, fire risk, emergency response times, access
to clean water, access to wastewater disposal systems, and street lighting”—resonates very close to our own
claim. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 1197–98. However, while she focuses more on how to implement such a
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and likely tax increases that a municipality’s financial recovery plan demands.
However, it would avoid the perverse effects arising from the combination of
increased fiscal pressure and retrenchment policies,249 preserving the sense of
legitimacy of social institutions and hence constraining the risk of citizens’ exit
and norm contagion across municipalities. Permitting public services to
continue allows social enforcement to continue—as individuals perceive the
government as abiding by the social contract, so too will they curb their own
lawless impulses and be incentivized to police those of others.
Similarly, selective centralized intervention would not leave local
administrators “unpunished” in cases where financial distress and increasing
urban decay could be attributed to bad management rather than the economic
cycle.250 As observed by one commentator, state responses to local financial
crises “almost always result[] in the creation of . . . financial control board[s]
[FCBs],”251 which are “powerful entities composed of appointed members
vested by the state with plenary powers that far exceed those available to local
elected officials.”252 Our proposal would not infringe upon a state’s ability to
use FCBs as a means to temporarily revoke delegated authority from local
officials. It would, however, require an adjustment of an FCB’s functions. As
their name suggests, FCBs have primarily been used to ensure the fiscal
integrity of distressed municipalities.253 This task has generally involved
supervising the implementation of austerity plans: state-approved balanced
budgets, cuts to city expenditures, and tax increases, leading to the perverse
effects described above.254
Our proposed adjustment would build upon the additional layer of control
FCBs provide while making it a means to preserve, rather than potentially
jeopardize, community viability. Under such an adjustment, FCBs should have
authority to supervise and manage the transfer of central funds to preserve
essential local services as well as to administer those services—in particular,

condition of habitability, our analysis is mainly concerned on explaining why implementing and preserving
such a condition is efficient from a social contract and aggregate welfare perspective.
249 See supra notes 212–15 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 200–02, 208–11 and accompanying text.
251 Note, supra note 222, at 734; see also Kimhi, supra note 190, at 654 (“A state financial board is a state
agency created to help a distressed locality overcome its economic troubles. The board usually oversees the
financial affairs of the city during its time of crisis, and initiates a rehabilitation process designed to help the
locality recover.” (footnote omitted)).
252 Note, supra note 222, at 734.
253 See Kimhi, supra note 190, at 670; Note, supra note 222, at 736.
254 See supra notes 212–15 and accompanying text.
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infrastructure investments. Coupled with the preservation of current FCB
control powers, which would help reign in residual moral hazard incentives,
this slight modification of FCB functions could transform it into an entity to
protect a community’s commitment to the rule of law in distressed times.255
Over time, experience gained by central governments, FCBs, and local
officials, especially in the case of large municipalities, would provide
beneficial information on the best courses of action to undertake with other
distressed municipalities. Based on that experience, central governments could
adjust their level of support to local municipalities, developing valuable
empirical evidence for improving implementation strategies. While this
process would necessarily require some trial and error, what is most important
is that partial government insurance offers a feasible alternative to the typical
binary options of “spend more” or “spend less” and the inefficient solution
these options provide to the trade-off between a polity’s moral hazard and its
degree of adhesion to the rule of law.
2. Urban Infrastructure and Social Welfare
A policy of selective intervention to solve the trade-off between the ex ante
risk of moral hazard and the ex post issues of urban decay necessarily invokes
a damage control philosophy. Upon distress, “controlling damages” appears as
the only available solution to avoiding further urban decline while internalizing
the risk of local official’s overspending and other opportunistic behaviors.
However, even outside the context of municipal emergency, this Article’s
central claim, that urban infrastructure quality has a direct impact on the
255 A note published in the Harvard Law Review in 1996 advocates a transformation of Financial Control
Boards into “Financial Reform Boards” (FRBs), which should seek regional reforms to ensure that troubled
municipalities “make the necessary structural and operational changes to avoid a recurrence.” See Note, supra
note 222, at 745–46. In principle, our proposal is compatible with the FRB proposal of planned regional
interventions. Nevertheless, the FRB proposal essentially focuses on correcting the lack of participatory
democracy implied by the appointment of non-elected FCBs members. See id. at 735, 749. Our theory, instead,
suggests that without ensuring the continued provision of essential local goods—such as a livable urban
environment—citizens are unlikely to have the incentives to exercise their political voice even if legally
entitled to do so. A more recent article by Clayton Gillette takes a different approach to FRBs, arguing that
vesting such entities with dictatorship-like powers “may provide a superior mechanism not only for addressing
current fiscal distress, but also for preventing its recurrence.” See Gillette, supra note 217, at 11. Viewing
municipal financial distress as the product of moral hazard and inefficient political structures, Gillette suggests
that only agents that can “operate outside the constraints of normal politics” have the right incentives to reform
those political structures. See id. The discussion of the trade-off between the costs and benefits of
implementing more democratic or authoritarian FRBs remain outside the scope of this Article. We argue,
however, that a full evaluation of that trade-off can only take place when one considers not only ex ante moral
hazard problems but also the ex post problems arising from urban decay.
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strength of the rule of law, provides the foundation for a more general
normative claim: adequate and sustained public investments in urban
infrastructure are essential to support the rule of law.
The conventional public policy rationale for promoting investments in
urban infrastructure usually rests on arguments that such investments lead to
economic growth and productivity, increased land values, improved energy
efficiency, and more rational public health systems. It is thus unsurprising that
a March 2012 report by the Department of Treasury and the Council of
Economic Advisers made all of those arguments256 to support “a bold plan to
renew and expand America’s infrastructure.”257 However, the link between the
quality of urban infrastructure and the strength of the rule of law is overlooked.
The link between urban infrastructure and the rule of law recasts
investments in urban infrastructure as a public policy issue that involves not
only distributive concerns, but also allocative concerns. Indeed, the gains
arising from investments in infrastructure have traditionally been
conceptualized as a benefit due to the American middle class, which receives
disproportionate advantages from such investments.258 Our research, however,
suggests that any American stands to benefit from increased spending on urban
infrastructure as such spending should be viewed as a bulwark against urban
decay and the potentially enormous, immediate, direct, and long-lasting costs
associated with the loss of the rule of law.
CONCLUSION
The rule of law stands at the heart of the social contract between
individuals in a civil society. As part of that contract, the government assumes
responsibility for coordinating the production and maintenance of essential
public goods. The presence of adequate public goods signals to individuals that
legal rules and institutions are meaningful and that most others share a
commitment to abide by law. This, in turn, encourages the development of
patterns of reciprocity and cooperation and, hence, leads to increased social
order.

256

See 2012 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 13, at 7–11.
Id. at 1 (specifying that the plan includes a $50 billion up-front investment connected to a $476 billion
six-year reauthorization of the surface transportation program and the creation of a National Infrastructure
Bank).
258 See id. at 3–4 (focusing on transportation infrastructure, and the impact this investment will have on
middle-class jobs).
257
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Urban infrastructure plays an especially salient role in supporting the social
contract, as each individual’s daily well-being is directly and inescapably
affected by the quality of the environment in which she lives. A livable and
high-quality urban environment acts as a powerful signal that both the
government and most others are fulfilling their obligations under the social
contract, spurring a beneficial upward spiral in which social cooperation and
social advocacy emerge as an equilibrium. Under this social equilibrium, the
rule of law becomes stronger and coercive government enforcement becomes
less necessary—with net social gains.
Urban decay, in contrast, signals to individuals that the government has
reneged on its obligations and causes them to assume that others have done the
same. The equilibrium of social cooperation and social advocacy is thus
shattered, as choosing rule defection over rule abidance becomes profitable for
individuals. Once rule defection spreads through norm contagion and becomes
both accepted and expected behavior among large portions of the polity,
coercive enforcement strategies, such as “zero tolerance” policing, can only
compensate at the margins, and can even lead to a declining rule of law in a
vicious cycle.
Given the critical role of urban infrastructure in supporting the rule of law,
policymakers concerned with welfare maximization should necessarily concern
themselves with preventing urban decay. However, long-standing austerity
policies aimed at municipalities have had the unintended effect of contributing
to urban decline. Detroit—like Baltimore, Gary, San Bernardino, and many
others—are but symptoms of the failure to appreciate the ex post costs of
austerity in creating urban decay and undermining the rule of law. In the
continued debate over the benefits and cost of austerity, the normative
implications of America’s decaying cities should no longer be ignored.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Ranking of Countries by URBAN Index Score
COUNTRY

TICK

URBAN

Singapore

SGP

88.22

Switzerland
Germany
Austria
Sweden

SWI
GER
OST
SWE

84.08
82.4
81.78
81.08

Denmark
Finland
Canada
United Kingdom

DNK
FIN
CAN
UK

80.75
80.27
79.76
79.63

Luxembourg
Iceland
Netherlands
Norway

LUX
ICL
NTL
NOR

79.13
78.89
78
77.5

Ireland
Portugal
France
New Zealand

IRE
POR
FRA
NZL

77.11
76.53
76.44
76.32

Australia
United States
Hong Kong
Qatar
Slovenia
Japan
United Arab Emirates
Spain
Kuwait

AUS
USA
HKG
QAT
SLV
JAP
UAE
SPA
KUW

76.31
76.27
75.25
75.25
75.11
75.04
74.17
73.69
72.69

WSM GALLEYSPROOFS2

62

9/18/2014 10:35 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1

COUNTRY

TICK

URBAN

Cambodia
Sri Lanka
Uruguay
Croatia

CMD
SRL
URY
CRO

71.6
71.41
71
70.92

Georgia

GEO

70.61

Malaysia
Czech Republic
Indonesia
Cyprus

MYS
CZR
IDN
CYP

70.57
69.44
69.41
68.98

China
Estonia
Saudi Arabia
Philippines
Korea (South)
Costa Rica
India
Guatemala
Italy
Hungary
Slovakia
Belgium
Bangladesh
Chile
Namibia
Panama
Bahrain
Colombia
Tajikistan
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Romania

CHI
EST
SDA
PLP
KOR
COR
IND
GTM
ITA
HUN
SLK
BEL
BGD
CHL
NAM
PAN
BAH
COL
TAJ
BHZ
ROM

68.4
68.23
68
67.75
67.31
67.06
66.87
66.48
66.18
65.79
65.65
65.01
64.7
64.28
64.25
63.88
63.71
63.63
63.39
63.19
62.75
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COUNTRY

TICK

URBAN

Poland
Thailand
Jamaica
Greece
Argentina

POL
THA
JAM
GRE
ARG

62.62
62.48
62.3
62.22
62.16

Israel

ISR

61.94

Turkey
Nicaragua
Latvia

TUR
NIC
LVA

61.3
61.2
61.19

Montenegro
Nepal
El Salvador
Mexico
Serbia
Jordan
Bolivia
Trinidad & Tobago
Malta
Vietnam
Azerbaijan
Pakistan
Kyrgyzstan
Paraguay
Puerto Rico*
Guyana
Madagascar
Brazil
Algeria
Iran
Kazakhstan

MNE
NPL
SLV
MEX
SRB
JOR
BOL
TTO
MLT
VNM
AZE
PAK
KGZ
PRY
PRI
GUY
MDG
BRA
DZA
IRN
KAZ

61.08
61.06
60.33
60.01
59.77
59.22
58.51
58.45
58.43
58.31
58.11
58
57.77
57.31
57.24
57.03
56.81
56.1
55.81
55.72
55.55
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COUNTRY

TICK

URBAN

Lithuania
Ecuador
Honduras
Armenia
Morocco
Venezuela

LTU
ECU
HND
ARM
MAR
VEN

55.39
55.38
55.17
54.64
54.56
54.1

Bulgaria

BGR

54.09

Cameroon
Lebanon

CAM
LEB

53.77
53.06

Albania
Mali
Rwanda
Malawi
Ukraine
Tunisia
Burundi
Mauritania
Dominican Republic
Peru
Moldova
Mongolia
Egypt
Ghana
Zambia
Kenya
Zimbabwe
Botswana
Mozambique
Russia
Uganda

ALB
MLI
RWA
MAL
UKR
TUN
BUR
MAU
DOM
PER
MOL
MON
EGY
GHA
ZAM
KEN
ZIM
BOT
MOZ
RUS
UGA

53.04
52.69
52.61
52.39
52.38
52.28
51.75
51.19
51
50.94
50.63
50.33
49.82
49.22
49.11
48.56
48.39
48.07
47.78
47.5
47.48
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COUNTRY

TICK

URBAN

Nigeria
Benin
Syria
Côte d’Ivoire
Burkina Faso
Chad
Senegal

NER
BEN
SYR
CIV
BFA
CHA
SEN

47.44
46.83
46.31
44.56
42.06
41.81
40.22

Ethiopia

ETH

39.61

For the purposes of our analysis, Puerto Rico is treated as a country.
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Table 2. Variable Definitions
In this Table, we provide definitions of all the variables we use in our
empirical analysis. Table 2.1 presents definitions for all the variables
composing our main independent variable (URBAN). Table 2.2 presents
definition for all other variables employed in our analysis, including our main
dependent variable (CPI), independent variable (URBAN), instrumental variable
(UNESCO) and control variables. All variables employed in our analysis are
measured on a scale from 0 to 100.
1. Urban Index Composition (defining all variables composing the index of
the quality of urban infrastructure—URBAN).
Variable
CITY BEAUTY

OVERALL CITY
SATISFACTION
TRAFFIC DISORDER
PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION
QUALITY OF AIR

QUALITY OF
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY
QUALITY OF ROADS
AND H IGHWAYS

QUALITY OF WATER

SAFE WALKING

Definition
Score based on the question: “In your city or area
where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with
the beauty or physical setting?”
Score based on the question: “Are you satisfied or
dissatisfied with the city or area where you live?”
Score based on Pedestrian Deaths per capita
Score based on the question: “In the city or area
where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with
the public transportation systems?”
Score based on the question: “In your city or area
where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with
the quality of air?”
Score based on survey of international organizations,
national sources, and executives.
Score based on average between: (i) survey of
international organizations, national sources, and
executives; (ii) survey based on the question: “In the
city or area where you live, are you satisfied or
dissatisfied with the roads and highways?”
Score based on the question: “In your city or area
where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with
the quality of water?”
Score based on the question: “Do you feel safe
walking alone at night in the city or area where you
live?”
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2. Other Variables (defining all variables used in our empirical analysis,
including URBAN).
Variable
CORRUPTION
PERCEPTION INDEX
(CPI)

URBAN INDEX
(URBAN)

UNESCO
GDP

HEALTH CARE
(HEALTHCARE)

EDUCATION

Definition
The CPI ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt
their public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite
index, a combination of polls, drawing on
corruption-related data collected by a variety of
reputable institutions and reflecting the views of
observers from around the world (including experts
living and working in the countries/territories evaluated).
The index takes values between 0 and 10. Higher values
indicate a lower perception of corruption in the country.
The CPI is based on the following questions:
Is corruption widespread within businesses located in
(country), or not?
Is corruption widespread throughout the government in
(country), or not?
Index ranking countries based on the quality of urban
infrastructure, considering components such as roads
and highways, electrical supply, water and air, public
transportation, traffic control, and overall city beauty. It
takes values between 0 and 100 and is computed by
taking the simple average of all the variables defined in
Table 2.1.
Number of World Heritage sites.
Annual GDP per capita.
Separated urban infrastructure variable. Score based on
the question: “In your city or area where you live, are
you satisfied or dissatisfied with the availability of
quality health care?”
Separated urban infrastructure index, taking value
between 0 and 100. Score based on the question: “In
your city or area where you live, are you satisfied or
dissatisfied with the education system or the schools?”

WSM GALLEYSPROOFS2

68

Variable
INCOME EQUALITY
(INCOMEEQUALITY)

HUMAN RIGHTS
(HUMANRIGHTS)
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Definition
Index ranking countries based on the extent to which the
distribution of income or consumption expenditure
among individuals or households within an economy
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. It takes
value between 0 and 100.
Index ranking countries based on the degree of lack of
protection or noncompliance of the obligations of States
in regard to human rights and the International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) in 195 countries (the 192
member states of the United Nations, as well as the
Palestinian Authority, Taiwan, and the Vatican).
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Table 3. Summary Statistics
In this Table, we present summary statistics of our dataset. For each
variable, the table reports the following statistics: mean, standard deviation,
minimum value, maximum value and median.

MEAN

SD

MIN

MAX

MEDIAN

HUMANRIGHTS

4.40
62.22
7.28
17.22
58.14
3.82
39.21
2.60

2.21
10.91
9.41
17.70
18.56
0.926
9.52
2.05

1.9
39.61
0
0.44
18
2.10
23
0.18

9.5
88.22
47
103.36
95
6.1
70.7
7.72

3.4
61.62
4
11.36
58
3.7
39.3
2.16

OBSERVATIONS

124

CPI
URBAN
UNESCO
GDP
HEALTHCARE
EDUCATION
INCOMEEQUALITY
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Table 4. First-Stage Regressions
In this Table, we show the first-stage estimates of univariate analysis
(Column (1)) and multivariate analysis (Columns (2) through (7)) of URBAN as
dependent variable and the following main independent variables: the
logarithm of UNESCO, GDP, HEALTHCARE, EDUCATION, INCOMEEQUALITY and
HUMANRIGHTS (all defined in Appendix Table 2).
Variables
UNESCO

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

URBAN

URBAN

URBAN

URBAN

URBAN

URBAN

URBAN

2.717**
(1.262)

1.891***
(0.616)

1.685***
(0.536)

1.916**
(0.814)

2.174*
(1.256)

0.440***
(0.0513)

GDP

0.328***
(0.0342)
6.835***
(0.781)

EDUCATION

0.184
(0.906)
-0.314***
(0.0730)

INCOMEEQ

HUMANRIGHTS

57.73*** 51.52***
(2.559)
(0.952)

OBSERVATIONS 124
R-SQUARED
0.055

124
0.559

1.778***
(0.515)
0.192***
(0.0436)

0.460***
(0.0386)

HEALTHCARE

CONSTANT

3.639***
(1.253)

-0.0493
(0.0384)
-2.064***
(0.442)

-0.564**
(0.249)

32.69***
(2.444)

32.97***
(2.687)

71.15***
(3.386)

61.12***
(2.860)

39.69***
(4.525)

124
0.659

124
0.387

110
0.138

114
0.223

101
0.766

